Health and safety:  Preliminary comparative assessment of the Satellite Power System (SPS) and other energy alternatives by Gasper, J. R. et al.
DOE/ER-0053
H_ETY: PRELIMINARY_< - - ?'
COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE
SATELLITE POWER SYSTEM (SPS) AND OTHER
ENERGY ALTERNATIVES
April 1980
U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Energy Research
Satellite Power System Project Division
DOE/NASA
SATELLITE POWER SYSTEM
Concept Development
and
Evaluation Program
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19810015060 2020-03-21T13:52:18+00:00Z
DOE/ER-0053
uC-11, 13, 41,48, 62, 63, 97c
HEALTH AND SAFETY: PRELIMINARY
COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE
SATELLITE POWER SYSTEM (SPS) AND OTHER
ENERGY ALTERNATIVES
April 1980
Prepared by:
L.J. Habegger, J.R. Gasper, and C.D. Brown*
II ll._;;_ll[;llt._.l r-_oo_:_OlllX;_llt._ ri.llli_,.i i %./lll_J,7 li..v_.,llll_llll=41b.iVli_._ _ill_.w_i,.41_
Energy and EnvironmentalSystems Division
Argonne NationalLaboratory
Argonne, lllinois60439
*Biologicaland Medical Research Division
Under ContractNo. 31-109-ENG-38
Prepared for:
U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Energy Research
Satellite Power System Project Division
Washington, D.C. 20545
DOE/NASA
SATELLITE POWER SYSTEM
Concept Development
and
Evaluation Program
ACKNOWLEDG_IENTS
Grateful acknowledgment for direction and support in the development of
this report is given to F. Koomanoff, director of the DOE SPS Project Office;
M. Riches, DOE project officer for the SPS Comparative Assessment; and T.
Wolskop ANL project manager for the SPS Comparative Assessment. The authors
also express their appreciation to L. Doak, A. Harris, and B. Salbego for
typing the manuscript, and to J. Korn, M. Koelbl, and L. Samek for preparation
of the drawings.
Acknowledgment is also due to the following reviewers who provided
valuable suggestions through a formal review of the draft manuscript; re-
viewer affiliation is given for informational purposes and does not nec-
essarily imply endorsement by those institutions: N. Barr, Office of Health
and Environmental Resources, DOE; B. Cohen, University of Pittsburgh; J. Crow,
Chairman, National Academy of Science Committee on Health and Safety Impacts
of Coal and Nuclear Energy, and University of Wisconsin; W. Ellet, Office of
Radiation Programs, Criteria and Standards Division, EPA; V. Miller, Radiation
Safety Officer, Sargent and Lundy Engineers; R. Wyzga, Program Manager,
Integrated Assessments, Electric Power Research Institute.
ill
DEFINITIONSOF UNIT SYMBOLS
Btu:
Ci:
cm :
dBa :
gal :
GHz :
GW:
J:
keV:
kg :
kW :
kWh :
Ib:
m:
meV:
mg :
ml :
roW:
MW:
MWe :
_Ci:
_g:
ppm:
rem:
V"
W:
yr:
British thermal unit
curie (unit of radioactivity: 3.7 x i0 I0 disintegrations per second)
centimeter
decibel (adjusted)
gallon
gigahertz (10 9 cycles per second)
gigawatt (10 9 watts)
Joule
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kilowatt hour
pound
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milligram
milliliter
milliwatt
megawatt
megawatt (electric)
microcurie
microgram
part per million
roentgen equivalent, man (unit of ionization - i.e., tissue damage -
due to radiation)
volt
watt
year
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The work reported here is part of the Satellite Power System Concept
Development and Evaluation Program (SPS CDEP), established by the SPS Project
Office of the U.S. Department of Energy. The purpose of that program is to
generate information from which rational decisions can be made regarding
development of SPS technology after fiscal year 1980. One phase of the
SPS CDEP is the comparative assessment of the SPS and selected alternative
energy systems with regard to the technical, economic, environmental, soci-
etal, and institutional issues surrounding the deployment of these tech-
nologies. Environmental issues concern the health and safety risks associated
with energy systems, and the SPS and four alternative electrical generation
systems are assessed here with regard to such risks. This report presents the
results of an initial phase of the health and safety assessment.
The approach developed and used in this assessment is intended to
provide information useful for decision making. Data readily available
from the literature were used to make an initial comparison of the health and
safety risks of_ fission power system with fuel reprocessing; a combined-
cycle coal power system with a low-Btu gasifier and open-cycle gas turbine; a
central-station, terrestrial, solar photovoltaic power system; the satellite
/
power system, and a first-generation fusion system. The assessment approach
consists of (i) the identification of health and safety issues in each phase
of the energy cycle from raw material extraction through electrical genera-
tion, waste disposal, and system deactivation; (2) quantitative or (if limited
by'data availability) qualitative evaluation of impact severity; and (3) the
rating of each issue with regard to known or potential impact level and level
of uncertainty. Evaluation of unquantifiable issues serves as a means of
identifying needed research.
The presentation of the health and safety issue comparisons between
technologies utilizes (i) diagrams showing system components, related health
and safety issues, and issue impact and uncertainty ratings; (2) issue summary
tables with quantitative impact values and qualitative descriptors; and (3)
detailed descriptions of each issue. The last component provides the basis
for the evaluation.
ix
Table I summarizes the results of this evaluation in terms of expected
deaths per year associated with 1,000 MW of electricity generation averaged
over a 30-year plant lifetime. This table also contains the number of issues
identified as being potentially significant but unquantifiable because of lack
of information.
When the systems are compared directly by total quantifiable deaths
per year, systems in a more advanced stage of development generally exhibit
higher impact or risk levels. The usefulness of this straightforward
comparison, however, is limited by the uncertainties of poorly quantified or
unquantlfied impacts. The quantified impacts of the terrestrial photovoltaic
system and the satellite power system are more uncertain than those of the
coal and light water reactor systems. The major quantified impacts of the
Table i. Quantifiable Health and Safety Impacts and Number of
Potentially Major but Currently Unquantifiable Issues a
Category
Expected Deaths per Year_ 30-Year Plant Lifetime
Fission Terrestrial Satellite Fusion
Energy Coal Photovoltaic Power Energy
System System System System System
Total 0.65(3) 5.84(2) 1.46(2) 0.31(4) 0.004(4)
_ublic 0.55(3) 3.70(1) 0.03(2) - (4) - (i)
Occupational 0.10(2) 2.14(1) 1.43(2) 0.31(1) 0.004(4)
Long Term 0.65(1) 5.75(2) 1.33(1) - (2) 0.0002(2)
Intermed.Term b - (-) 0.92(-) 0.13(2) 0.31(2) 0.004(1)
Short Term - (2) - (-) - (-) - (i) - (i)
(Catastrophic)
Accidents 0.25(3) 4.30(-) 1.43(1) 0.3 (2) 0.004(1)
Disease - (-) 1.54(2) 0.03(2) 0.01(3) - (i)
Radiation 0.39(3) c 0.0023(-) c - (-) - (i) d - (2) c
aNumbers of potentially major but unquantifiable issues in parentheses.
bOccurring during raw material extraction, processing, fabrication for
component production, and system deactivation. Estimates are plant
lifetime total for 1,000-MW generation.
Clonizing radiation.
dMicrowave radiation.
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terrestrial photovoltaic system are projected to occur mainly during construc-
tion and maintenance of the large arrays of solar collectors; however, no
historical precedents for such activities exist. In addition, the SPS and
fusion systems, which have the lowest level of quantifiable impacts, have the
largest number of unquantifiable issues.
Similarly, when the systems listed in Table i are compared on the basis
of quantifiable public (non-occupational) impacts, a higher level is again
estimated for the more developed or near-term technologies. However, the
number of unquantifiable public impacts is greatest for fusion and the
satellite power system and least for coal energy systems.
For the impacts of component production and facility construction,
averaged over a 30-year plant lifetime, the solar technologies have the
greatest impact because of their larger labor requirements compared to those
of the coal and light water reactor technologies.
It may be unrealistic to evaluate catastrophic events in terms of
an averaged death risk per year of plant operation because the significance of
such events is perceived differently by the public. A major factor in the
determination of the future viability of a new technology may be the real or
perceived potential for the occurrence of a catastrophic event even though
the more continuous, low-rlsk hazards may be minor. Therefore, this assess-
ment treats the potential for catastrophic events in a separate evaluation;
because of the large uncertainty in the estimates of impacts from catastrophic
events, these issues are included in the llst (Table 2) of unquantlfiable
issues.
Results of this first phase of the health and safety assessment will
be used in the second phase, which will include the evaluation of cumulative
health and safety impacts of the alternative technologies within an energy
scenario. This analysis will account for the effects of achievable load
factors for the technologies and will include analyses of health and safety
impacts from required back-up and storage systems. The second phase will also
reassess the assumptions on which first-phase analyses were based, and
revisions to the estimates will be made on the basis of additional informa-
tion. A further extension will be the analysis of a decentralized or small-
scale electric energy technology.
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ABSTRACT
The work reported here is an analysis of existing data on the health
and safety risks of a satellite power system and four electrical generation
systems: a combined-cycle coal power system with a low-Btu gasifler and
open-cycle gas turbine, a fission power system with fuel reprocessing, a
central-statlon, terrestrial, solar-photovoltalc power system, and a first-
generation design for a fusion power system. The systems are compared on the
basis of expected deaths and person-days lost per year associated with 1,000
MW of average electricity generation and on the number of health and safety
risks thatare identified as potentially significant but unquantifiable. The
appendices provide more detailed information on risks, uncertainties, addi-
tional research needed, and references for the identified impacts of each
system.
i INTRODUCTION
Among the more important considerations in a comparative assessment
of the SPS and alternative systems are the impacts of these technologies on
human health and safety. This assessment is being conducted in two phases,
and this report presents the results of the preliminary phase. The objectives
of this preliminary phase were as follows:
(i) To develop a taxonomy for the comparative assessment and
a format for presenting information in a manner useful
for comparing the health and safety impacts of the Satel-
lite Power System (SPS) and alternative technologies. The
taxonomy and format are described in Sec. 2.
(2) To conduct a preliminary assessment of the SPS and four
alternative energy systems by organizing available informa-
tion using this taxonomy and format. The energy systems
considered are a light water fission reactor (LWR) with
fuel reprocessing, a combined-cycle coal system (CG/CC)
with a low-Btu gasifier and open-cycle gas turbine, a
central-station, terrestrial photovoltaic system (TPV), and
a first-generation fusion system with deuterium-tritium
fuel and a lithium blanket. Assessment of additional
technologies and revisions to these technologies will be
part of the second phase of the assessment. The health and
safety impacts for the individual systems are discussed
in Sec. 3, and the impacts of the systems are compared in
Sec. 4.
(3) To identify those aspects of health and safety impact
definition that will require analysis and research so
that more definitive comparisons of the technologies can
be made. These aspects of the assessment are discussed in
Sec. 3 and listed in the appendices.
In addition to providing an initial comparison of health and safety
impacts, this assessment will provide input to a forthcoming second-phase
assessment that will be more comprehensive. For example, the preliminary
assessment focuses on the identification of death risks, whereas the second
phase will also evaluate person-days lost through nonfatal accidents and
disease. A major objective of the second phase should be the evaluation of
the cumulative health and safety impacts of the alternative technologies for
national energy scenarios. That analysis should account for the effects of
achievable load factors for the technologies and include an analysis of the
health and safety impacts of required back-up and storage systems.
The estimates of health and safety impacts compiled in this preliminary
assessment rely heavily on other studies. A subsequent phase of this assess-
ment should consider in more detail the assumptions on which these analyses
were based, and revisions to the estimates should be made on the basis of
additional information.
L
2 APPROACH
The major components of the health and safety assessment are dis-
cussed in this section. The components described are the identification
and categorization of major health and safety issues (Sec. 2.1) and the
assignment of ratings of impact severity and uncertainty for each issue
(Sec. 2.2).
2.1 ISSUE IDENTIFICATION AND CATEGORIZATION
The first step in issue identification and categorization was the
compilation of all known and potential major health and safety issues that
could be unambiguously defined and discussed. In order to produce an easily
comprehensible llst of issues for each technology, similar impacts were
grouped together, and quantitatively negligible impacts were excluded.
Each segment of the complete energy cycle was considered, including
raw material extraction, material processing, component fabrication, transpor-
tation, facility construction, facility operation _nd maintenance, waste
disposal, and plant deactivation. The raw materials considered in the ex-
traction and processing segment include fuels as well as materials such as
cement, iron, copper, bauxite, and gallium aluminum arsenide, which are used
in facility construction. The mining and processing of these materials are
major components of the solar technologies considered in this report.
An evaluation of each health or safety issue identified was conducted
and documented according to the format shown in Table 2.1. The results of
these evaluations, contained in the appendices, provide a direct link to the
assumptions used in overall technology assessments and comparisons. This link
will facilitate the subsequent phase of the assessment that will include more
detailed and updated analyses of major issues.
Issue categorization is an important aspect of the evaluation. It
is generally accepted that the impacts on human health and safety are among
the most important considerations in a comparative evaluation of alternative
technologies. General acceptance of a high priority for health and safety
issues does not imply, however, that quantification of all such effects
will give common values for straightforward ranking of energy systems. Each
Table 2.1. Format for Issue Identification and Evaluation a
Evaluation
Component Description
TECHNOLOGY
ISSUENUMBER
PROCESS
IMPACTCATEGORY
PROBLEMSOURCE
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT
QUANTITATIVEIMPACT
ESTIMATE
MAJORUNCERTAINTIES
REQUIRINGR&D
REGULATORYSTATUS
SEVERITYINDEX
UNCERTAINTYINDEX
REFERENCES
Light water reactors, combined-cycle coal,
terrestrial photovoltaic, satellite power
system, and fusion.
Rawmaterial or fuel extraction, material
processing, component fabrication, transporta-
tion, facility operation and maintenance, waste
disposal, and deactivation.
Categorization of issues along dimensions given
in Table 2.2.
Description of factors or conditions producing
health or safety risk.
Description of the nature of impact on human
health or safety, e.g., carcinogenic, mutagenic,
or toxic effects.
Assumptions and methodology leading to quanti-
tative impact estimate.
Major areas requiring further research and anal-
ysis that would provide a definitive issue
evaluation or risk quantification.
Current regulations and potential for additional
regulation to mitigate impact.
Relative impact rating using index described in
Table 2.3.
Relative uncertainty in issue impact evaluation
using index described in Table 2.4.
References used in conducting issue identifica-
tion and evaluation.
aSee appendices.
component of energy production differs from others not only in the level,
but also in the manner in which health and safety effects are incurred. These
distinctions affect society's perception of "acceptable" health and safety
effects and therefore should be preserved in the analysis. Accordingly, for
this preliminary analysis, each issue was categorized along the dimensions
given in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2. Categorization of Health and Safety Issues
Categorization
Component Description of Categories
Persons Affected
Impact Duration and Rate
Impact Cause
Impact Severity
The general public
Energy-related workers
Intermediate term, moderate level (e.g., occurs
during component raw material extraction, process-
ing and transport; component fabrication; plant
construction; or plant deactivation)
Long-term, low-level (e.g., occurs during fuel
extraction, plant operation and maintenance, waste
disposal, or waste management)
Short-term, high-level (e.g., catastrophic events)
Accidents
Disease (e.g., chemical pollutants causing disease
through toxicity or carcinogenesis)
Radiation (ionizing radiation and nonionizing
radiation from microwaves)
Fatalities
Person-days lost (nonfatal accidents and disease)
Catastrophic events (defined in this study as single events leading to
over 1,000 deaths) constitute a prime example of the need for categorization.
Because of the engineered low risk of occurrence for these events, the number
of expected deaths per year, averaged over the lifetime of the plant, may be
lower than that from continuous low-impact risks, but the public perception of
the significance of these potential events may critically affect the viability
of a technology.
Categorization thus precludes the possibility that the rankings of
the health and safety impacts for each technology will be combined into a
single normative factor that would allow definitive ranking of the alternative
energy systems. The technologies are compared using various indicators
described in Sec. 4, but the final comparison must be reserved for the
decision maker who will use formal or informal decision analysis to evaluate
issues in terms of a broad set of perceived societal objectives.
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2.2 INDICES OF SEVERITY AND UNCERTAINTY
The principal measure of the severity of health and safety impacts is
the estimate of expected person-days lost and deaths per unit period or per
event attributable to the energy system or system segment. In addition to
this quantitative measure, the separate issues identified for each system are
assigned to impact level and uncertainty categories. By separating the
hazards that are quantifiable and clearly defined from those that are of
potential significance but are currently unquantlfiable, the rating system
helps to focus the SPS evaluation on the most significant issues. The
index of uncertainty is a subjective measure based on the verifiability of the
cause-effect relationship that determines the impact and on the degree of
reliability of the impact estimate for each health issue. Table 2.3 defines
severity ratings on the basis of the annual level of health and safety impacts
averaged over the 30-year lifetime of a power plant (i,000 MW). Table 2.4
defines the uncertainty ratings.
In addition to defining severity ratings for quantifiable impacts,
the rating procedure in Table 2.3 also applies to issues that are unquantifi-
able. These issues are rated largely on the basis of a qualitative under-
standing of the potential hazards, for which impact data are not available
because of lack of sufficient operating experience in a present technology or
a lack of analogy between existing and future technologies. An (A) severity
rating is given to a potential hazard for which a reasonable operating
scenario can be envisioned in which human interactions could result in a
significant number of injuries or disease occurrences. An event of low
Table 2.3. Index of Severity of Health and Safety Impacts
Hazard Category
Level of
Impact (x)
Fatallties/1000 MW/yr Severity Rating
Quantifiable
Unquantiflable
x>0.1
0. i > x > 0.01
x < 0.01
High (may be significant, x > 0.01)
Low (probably insignificant, x < 0.01)
i
2
3
A
B
Table 2.4. Index of Uncertainty of Health and Safety Impacts
Causal Relationship
and Impact Level
Severity
Uncertainty Rating
Index Options
Causal relationship and
impact levels relatively
well established (e.g., coal 1
mining accidents)
Established but poorly
quantified causal relationship 2
(e.g., low-level ionizing radiation)
Cause-effect association
established, but extremely
variable impact level
estimates (e.g., ground water 3
pollution, catastrophic events)
1,2,3
1,2,3
A,B
probability of occurrence and of limited impact is assigned a (B) severity
rating.
To gain a perspective on the relative societal implications of the
health and safety issues within each of these severity categories, it is
useful to compare the range of impact levels within the categories with
other health and safety risks to which the general population is exposed.
Since the U.S. electrical power consumption per 106 persons is approximately
i000 MW, 1 the units of fatallties/i000 """---
_,w1_L can be considered equivalent
to fatalities/yr/106 persons for purposes of comparison with other risks.
(This is only Strictly true when risks are evaluated on the basis of the
average for a generic population since the electricity users of a specific
facility are not necessarily the group that incurs the risk from that
facility.) As illustrated in Fig. 2.1, this comparison indicates that the
risks from air pollution, background radiation, saccharin, urban drinking
water, and lightning, to which a large segment of the population is exposed,
would all receive a "high" or "i" severity rating under the energy system
issue categorization chosen.
The uncertainty assigned to each severity rating is based on the
degree to which the cause-effect relationship of the hazard-impact has been
established and on the reliability of the impact quantification or impact
10
ENERGY SYSTEM
IMPACT SEVERITY CATEGORIES
ESTIMATED
FATALITIES/YR/I O6 ELECTRICITY USERS a
( I O 6 kW GENERATION)
-'1I
IOC
I0
I.O
"HIGH( I )"
SEVERITY ISSUES
"MODERATE(2)"
SEVERITY ISSUES
"LOW(3)"
SEVERITY ISSUES
O.I
O.OII
OTHER RISKS
ESTIMATED
FATALITIES/YR/IO 6 PERSONS b
,-,----AIR POLLUTION (SULFATES) c
BACKGROUND RADIATION
"--AT SEA LEVEL d
..,_._SACCHARIN e
""--URBAN DRINKING WATER f
...,,,..__LIGHTNING
Fig. 2.1. Impact Severity Categories for Energy System Health and
Safety Issues in Comparison to Risks from Other Causes
a) Estimated fatalities from electrical generation do not
necessarily occur within user group.
b) From Ref. 2.
c) Based on average U.S. exposure.
d) No. of cancers based on linear extrapolation of human
epidemiologlcal data.
e) No. of cancers based on average U.S. consumption and linear
extrapolation of animal data.
f) No. of cancers based on multistage extrapolation from animal
data with Miami and New Orleans drinking water.
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potential. Ratings assigned the lowest level of uncertainty (I) were those
for which strong arguments could be maderegarding the existence of a cause-
effect relationship between existence of the hazard and the occurrence of
resulting impacts and for which the degree of impact was well defined, prima-
rily through historical data. Issues rated at higher uncertainty (2) were
those for which cause-effect relationships are established but not reliably
quantified. The highest uncertainty (3) was assigned to those issues for
which only cause-effect associations could be madeor for which impact levels
were unquantifiable or extremely variable.
13
3 INDIVIDUAL ENERGY SYSTEM ASSESSMENTS
This section summarizes the results of the issue identification and
evaluation for each of the five technologies considered in the preliminary
evaluation: light water reactors, combined-cycle coal system, centralized,
terrestrial photovoltaic system, satellite power system, and fusion. Each
technology is described briefly; more detailed characterizations are being
developed in another component of the SPS Comparative Evaluation Program, 3
and the descriptions in this report are subject to change in the final
assessment on the basis of those characterizations.
The first level of display of the health and safety assessment con-
sists of compact flow diagrams of health and safety issues as they relate to
the processes associated with the complete cycle of each technology. These
diagrams represent the most compact and easily comprehensible summary of
issues and their potential significance. Each issue shown in a diagram is
accompanied by issue categories (public or occupational and health or safety),
severity ratings, and uncertainty ratings.
Summary tables represent the next level of detail. In addition to the
information included in the flow diagrams, the tables indicate whether an
impact is continuous (occurring more or less uniformly over the lifetime of
the plant) or short term (occurring over relatively short periods such as
during plant construction or as the result of catastrophic events). Also
included are a summary of the impact quantifica£1un and a u=__v_._-_- v_
uncertainties in the impact definition or quantification.
The issue descriptions and evaluations in the appendices provide the
most detailed analysis of the issues for each technology, including citation
of data sources.
3.1 FISSION POWER SYSTEM WITH FUEL REPROCESSING
3.1.1 System Description 4
Light water reactor (LWR) technology dominates the U.S. nuclear power
industry. In this system,_ heat is generated by uranium fission. The thermal
energy produced is transferred to a working fluid to produce high-temperature,
14
high-pressure steam, which passes through a turbine generator to produce
electric power. Apart from the nature of its fuel, the basic operation of a
fission power station is similar to that of a fossil-fueled steam-electric
plant.
The two common LWR options are the pressurized water reactor (PWR)
and the boiling water reactor (BWR). Both reactors use light water as a
coolant and moderator. In the BWR, water is circulated through the reactor
core, where it is converted under pressure to steam. This steam is passed
directly through the turbine, cooled, and recirculated to the reactor. The
PWR is operated at a pressure high enough to ensure that water passed through
the reactor does not boil. The thermal energy in this primary coolant loop is
transferred to the working fluid of a secondary steam loop, which is routed
through the turbine.
Natural uranium occurs as the oxide U308, which contains only 0.7% of
the fissile isotope 235U. To be useful as reactor fuel, the flssile isotope
concentration must be raised to between 2% and 3%. This is accomplished
through fuel processing, during which the oxide is converted by chemical
reaction with HF to UF 6. The fluoride is then processed through a gaseous
diffusion plant, which produces an enriched product. The enriched UF 6 is then
converted to U02, the form in which it is fabricated into fuel pellets.
Reprocessing involves dissolving the spent fuel in aqueous acid, followed by a
series of solvent extractions and ion exchange operations that remove fission
products and separate the plutonium from the uranium and then purify the two
products. The two advantages of reprocessing are the conservation of fuel
resources and reduction of the volume of waste to ba isolated.
For this study a I,O00-MWe boiling water reactor is used.
design parameters relevant to the study include:
Overall efficiency
Unit lifetime
Uranium (U02, enriched)
Emissions
3H
85Kr
133X e
Additional
33%
30 years
129 metric tons (31 metric tons
replaced, i metric ton consumed)
16,900 Ci
290,000 Ci
580 Ci
15
Figure 3.1 is a simplified representation of a boiling water reactor.
3.1.2 Summary of Health and Safety Issues
The major health and safety issues identified are illustrated in Fig.
3.2 and summarized in Table 3.1. The nuclear fuel cycle, as it pertains to
electrical power generaion, carries a set of health and safety risks both for
workers and for the general population. 5, 6 Although the radiological hazards
of nuclear energy have received wide attention, the nuclear fuel cycle con-
tains nonradiological risks as well. The principal health issues related
to the fuel cycle are associated with the physical hazards of fuel handling
and radiologlcal hazards that result in general population exposures. Esti-
mates of the impact of the annual operational requirements of a 1,000-MWe
light water reactor are on the order of 0.334 fatal injury per year from
physical hazards and 0.005-0.134 fatality per year attributable to ionizing
radiation exposure. 7
The major portion of the impact of physical hazards to the occupational
population occurs during ore extraction. In recent years, uranium miners have
experienced roughly the same risk (on a person-hour basis) as coal miners. 8
However, on an energy basis, injury rates from uranium mining are much lower
than coal mining owing to the high energy content of nuclear fuel. The
remainder of work force injury is associated primarily with fuel processing
REACTOR
STEAM TURBINE _ [ =
CONDENSER
STEAM
PUMP _-
GENERATOR
I'-I
COOLING TOWER
Fig. 3.1. Light Water Reactor
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Flg. 3.2. Flow Diagram of Health and Safety Issues of the Light
Water Reactor Power System wlth Fuel Reprocesslng
and power plant operation. Injuries in these processes result from the
usual array of industrial accidents.
Materials transport is requlred in all steps of the nuclear fuel
cycle. Since the transportation mode is prlmarily by truck wlth some rall
transport, it is assumed that general population interactions and resulting
physlcal injurles wlthln the fuel cycle are in proportion to the use of these
modes. 9
The principal health effects of exposure to lonlzlng radiation are
acute radlatlon sickness, cancer, and genetic defects. There have been seven
reported fatalltles from acute radiation sickness in the Unlted States (none
since 1961). 10 The B1ologlcal Effects of lonlzlng Radiation report II gives
estimates of low-level radlatlon effects in terms of cancer deaths and even-
tual genetlc defects. These estlmates predict 180 x 10 -6 cancer deaths per
rem and 150 x 10 -6 genetic defects per rem of whole-body population exposure
and are used to predlct the delayed effects of the nuclear fuel cycle.
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Low-level radiation exposure is inherent in ore components of the
nuclear fuel cycle. Uranium miners and handlers are exposed to uranium
daughter products, including 222Rn, which are known to present carcinogenic
risks. 21 Radiation-induced lung cancers have been observed in underground
miners exposed to radon decay products. Ore tailings also contain measurable
quantities of radium and radon and have been identified as a potential source
of radiation exposure to the general public as well as to occupational popu-
lations.
Low-level radiation exposure occurs during operation and routine
maintenance of nuclear facilities. Both plant workers and the general public
are exposed to low-level radiation from normal releases and minor leaks in the
system piping. These emissions consist of uranium fission products and activa-
tion products from the structural components of the reactor system. Of
particular concern are the gaseous emissions of 14C, 85Kr, 1311, and 3H.
The magnitude of risk associated with radiation levels caused by
these releases continues to be the subject of much debate. However, for the
operation of a 1,000-MWe power plant, it is tentatively estimated that plant
workers will have 0.012-0.024 fatal disease case per year from lung cancer and
that there will be 0.01-0.16 fatal disease case per year in the general
population, from cancer and genetic defects. 15
Other major issues associated with light water reactors are not as
easily quantifiable. The primary issue relating to plant operation and
maintenance is that of a catastrophic event (issue 8).17,1_.... _L_Ivu_LIA_...._ the
probability of a core meltdown or significant release of radiation is pro-
jected to be minimal, any such occurrence would be highly visible and would
significantly affect the LWR industry. Similar situations are addressed by
Issues ii and 5, the diversion of plutonium for weapons, 7 and the potential
exposure of workers and the public to hydrogen fluoride during fuel enrichment
and fabrication.9, 22 Although the probability of occurrence of either event
is low and can be minimized hy preventive procedures, the possibility of such
an occurrence with accompanying impacts is a significant issue potentially
limiting the LWR.
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3.2 C_BINED-CYCLECOALPOWERSYSTEMWITHLOW-BTUGASIFIERAND
OPEN-CYCLEGASTURBINE
3.2.1 System Description
The conceptual design for a comblned-cycle coal power plant used in the
analysis (see Fig. 3.3) was obtained from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's Energy Conversion Alternatives Study. 23 Since the basis
for the SPS evaluation program are year-2000 technologies, a design based on
appropriate gaseous fuel emission standards was used (0.086 kg S02/109 J
input). According to this design, fixed-bed gasifiers generate low-Btu gas,
which is chemically treated in a gas-cleanup system so that the fuel combusted
and supplied to the gas turbine can meet the SO 2 emission standard. Pre-
processed Illinois No. 6 coal is fed to the gasifier. In the bottoming cycle,
thermal energy from the gas turbine exhaust is used to generate steam to drive
a turbine generator. Approximately two-thirds of the energy output is gener-
ated by the gas turbine and one-thlrd by the steam turbine. The conceptual
design is for 585 MWe net output and was scaled linearly to 1,000 MWe for this
study.
COAL. A PROCESS
PROCESS i-"_--i _
,A'rER_I STEAM
• ;_I _I-_'_:'E_'I--:-COOL,NG'ATER
I lCONDENSERF"COOL,NG
I i............_ WATER
TO
STACK
HEAT
RECOVERY
STEAM
GENERATORS
DRIVE
STEAM
PROCESS
Fig. 3.3. Combined-Cycle Coal Power System with Low-Btu
Gasifier and Open-Cycle Gas Turbine
21
Additional design parameters relevant to this study include:
Overall efficiency
Unit lifetime
Coal
SOx emissions
NOx emissions
Ash disposal
Water discharge
Sludge
39.6%
30 years
0.38 kg/kWh
0.085 kg/lO 9 J
0.08 kg/lO 9 J
0.36 kg/kWh
0.34 kg/kWh
0.001 kg/kWh
3.2.2 Summary of Health and Safety Issues
The major health and safety issues identified are illustrated in Fig.
3.4 and summarized in Table 3.2. The major quantifiable impact for the
comblned-cycle coal system is related to continuous public exposure to atmos-
pheric emissions (Issue 6: I death/year within an 80-km radius). 24
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Fig. 3.4. Flow Diagram of the Health and Safety Issues
of the Combined-Cycle Coal Power System with
Low-Btu Gasifier and Open-Cycle Turbine
22
oJ
4J
C/'J
:>..
_-j
o
[._
,-I
o ,-f
0J
Y_
o IlJ
ctl o
e_
I
o _ :_
_ o
I
c_ ,.-t _ _ I=i ','1
-_ _ o_ _ ,_
o ,_
rj
X X _I X _I i_I
X X X X
0 0 _ 0
_ _o
8 ._ _ 8,_
o I: o
O'3
gg
!
o
_g
_g
_4
0
N
23
o
c_
v
r-t
u
.,4
u
.i.4
_o
_Q
.-IC_
r_ 0J
c_ E-4
I
C.)
I
.-t
g u_0
-i
n_
0
m
®_ _ _ _ °_
I
I
u u
¢N
I
#-
_g
d
o
24
Although air pollutants from coal conversion (SO x in particular) have been
shown to correlate statistically with health effects, considerable uncertainty
remains as to the actual impact mechanisms and the role of synergistic effects
from specific combinations of pollutants that would be emitted from new
combined-cycle technologies. Increased public exposure from long-range
transport of pollutants (Issue i0) could also substantially increase impact
estlmates.43, 44
Next to the effects of air pollutants, the largest public impact
results from railroad grade-crossing accidents associated with coal transport
(Issue 3). 27,28 This impact is different in nature from air-pollutant effects
in that a direct cause-effect relationship can be established.
The issue of chemical pollutants in effluents (Issue 7) was given a
high uncertainty rating (3) because of lack of data for quantification. In
the past, coal-related effluents (e.g., mine effluents) have created signifi-
cant water quality problems 39 and may create additional issues (e.g., gasifi-
cation effluents). 30-32 However, since these are expected to be controllable
with available technology as mandated by existing water quality legislation, 39
a low subjective severity rating was specified (B).
The safety and health impacts of coal mining on occupational popula-
tions25, 26 (Issues 1 and 2) are of the same order of magnitude as those on
the public due to exposure to coal combustion emissions.
The estimate of occupational accident risk associated with generating-
plant operations 24,29,44 (Issue 13) was large enough (over 0. i death/yr) to
place this issue in the category with the highest severity rating, al-
though the accident estimates are considerably lower than those for coal
mining.
The preprocesslng, gasification, and combustion of coal in the
combined-cycle facility results in various products that can be carcinogenic
and toxic if inhaled or in contact with skin over extended periods. 30-35
The potential concentrations of these substances are uncertain, but they are
of sufficient concern to warrant an (A) severity rating for Issue 5.
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3.3 CENTRALTERRESTRIALPHOTOVOLTAICPOWERSYSTEM
3.3.1 System Description
Several system designs have been proposed for terrestrial photovoltaic
central power systems. Although the conceptual frameworks of these designs
are similar, significant variations exist in facility size, photovoltaic array
geometry, and type of photovoltaic cells used. The system design used in this
assessment is based on a characterization done by TRW for the Satellite Power
System Comparative Assessment. 3 Unit facility size was 200 _, which was
linearly scaled to 1,000 MW for the present study. Major components include
eight 25-MW arrays of photovoltaic cells arranged in a rectangular configura-
tion with gross linear dimensions of approximately 1,336 x 3,038 m, a DC-AC
converter station adjacent to this module, and a centrally located switching
transformer station to interface the facility with the utility grid
(Fig. 3.5).
The types of photovoltaic cells making up the arrays are not specified
in the TRW design 3 but are assumed to be one of three types -- cadmium/silicon
(Cd/S), silicon, or gallium aluminum arsenide (GaAlAs). 45 The arrays may be
of the flat plate or concentrating type.
Dimensions
Voltage
Current
Power
Cell lifetime
Other cell characteristics include:
0.05 x 0.05 m
0.4 VDC
0.72 A
0.3 - 0.5 W
5-10 yr 6
3.3.2 Summary of I1ealth and Safety Issues
Five major health and safety issues (Fig. 3.6, Table 3.3) have been
identified for central, terrestrial photovoltaic (TPV) power systems. Health
impacts of three are currently quantifiable, two are not. Issue 1 pertains to
procurement of raw materials and manufacture of photovoltaic cells. Although
some experience with silicon cells has been accumulated, primarily through the
space program, what is known about worker health and safety and public expo-
sure to toxic substances is based on limited-scale applications. The proposed
use of Cd/S or GaAiAs cells further increases the uncertainty of efforts
26
to quantify health impacts due to lack of data on pathways of humanexposure
and toxicity. However, the relative risk of workers involved in TPV cell
production activities is amongthe highest in the U.S. (averaging 130 person
days lost per year per i00 full-time workers compared to the U.S. industry
average of 59 person days lost per i00 full-tlme workers). 29
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Fig. 3.5. Central Terrestrial Photovoltaie Power System
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Environmental effluents emitted during cell production contain poten-
tially toxic substances (e.g., As, Cd, Pb, phenols, and silicon dust). Many
toxic substances concentrate through food chains, thus increasing toxicity.
Large-scale development of TPV could result in significant releases of these
toxic substances and subsequent public health exposure. 45 As a result of
these considerations, Issue i rates an (A) severity ranking with a (3)
uncertainty level.
Issue 5, exposure to toxic substances from disposal of spent photo-
voltaic cells, is another issue for which health and safety impacts are
difficult to quantify. Doping agents in advanced photovoltaic cells (As, Ga,
and Cd) are toxic. Although the lifetime of a TPV is projected to be 30
years, photovoltaic cells are projected to last an average of 5 years. 47 In
order to produce 1,000 MW of energy per year, 1.27 x 107 kg of GaAlAs poly-
crystal will be required, or 9.8 x 103 kg of Cd/S. 45 These requirements will
create the need to dispose of or recycle large amounts of potentially toxic
material, thus increasing occupational and public risk of exposure to toxic
substances. For these reasons, Issue 5 is given an (A) severity rating
with a (3) uncertainty rating.
Issue 2, extraction, processing, and transportation of conventional
materials (e.g., glass, cement, and steel) for use in TPV, can be partially
quantified. The public and occupational health and safety impacts of the
issue have been estimated by Inhaber 46 and Caputo 42 by applying injury and
illness statistics to TPV material and transportation needs. The number of
projected impacts justifies giving this issue a (i) severity rating. The wide
range in estimates accounts for the uncertainty rating of (2).
Inhaber and Caputo have also estimated occupational health and safety
impacts of TPV construction (Issue 3) and operation and maintenance (Issue
4).42, 46 Estimates of construction manpower requirements vary significantly
(80.8 - 33,700 man hours/MW) between sources. The primary construction trades
involved (cement, electrical, roofing, and sheet metal) are high-risk occupa-
tions. Estimates of occupational health and safety impacts from cleaning
lenses, maintaining transformers, and operation activities also vary consider-
ably. Maximum estimates of impacts justify a (i) severity rating for both
issues, and the variance in impact estimates dictates rating both at an
uncertainty level of (2).
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3.4 SATELLITEPOWERSYSTEM
3.4.1 System Description
Major components of the NASA satellite power system reference design
include a satellite composed of a graphite composite structure, gallium
aluminum arsenide (GaAIAs) solar cells, a power amplifier/transmission system
utilizing a klystron for baseline power amplification and DC-RF power conver-
sion, a graphite/epoxy transmitting antenna, and a pilot-beam directional
system (Fig. 3.7). Total surface area of the satellite, which is located in
geosynchronous orbit (GEO), may exceed 55 km2. 48 The terrestrial receiving
station (rectenna), which receives and rectifies the microwave power beam,
consists of a series of rectifying diodes on steel mesh ground planes mounted
on steel and concrete structures. Total active panel area per rectenna is
projected to be 80 km2, 48 and a surrounding exclusion zone will result in land
requirements in excess of i00 km 2 per site. 48 A considerable amount of space
GEOSYNCHRONOUS
EARTH ORBIT ........-'"''"""'_ _
MICROWAVE
TRANSMISSION
11 ANTENNA
J '_PHOTOVOLTAICCELL ARRAY
Fig. 3.7. Satellite Power System
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transportation will be required during construction, operation, and mainten-
ance. Heavy-lift launch vehicles (HLLV) (LCH4- or LO2-propelled ) will be
used to transport materials to low earth orbit (LEO), and personnel orbital
transfer vehicles (POTV) propelled by ion thrusters will be used between LEO
and GEO.
The current SPS Reference Design calls for construction of two 5-GW
systems per year for 30 years, with initial operation beginning in 2000 and a
total sytem capacity of 300 GWachieved by 2030.48
Additional design parameters relevant to this study include the
following:
SPSunit lifetime
Power Beamoperating frequency
Power density levels 48
Center transmitting antenna
Edge transmitting antenna
Center rectenna
Edge rectenna
Grating lobe levels
30 years
2.45 GHz
22 kW/cm2
2.4 kW/cm2
23 mW/cm2
I mW/cm2
<0.01 mW/cm2
3.4.2 Summary of Health and Safety Issues
The major health and safety issues associated with the SPS are identi-
fied in Fig. 3.8. Due to the uncertain nature of the SPS design and lack of
experience relating to large-scale space projects using SPS technologies,
estimation of the extent of many identified health and safety issues involves
a great deal of extrapolation. However, a good data base does exist for the
technologies and processes needed to supply conventional materials and ser-
vices (e.g., cement, steel, mining, and construction) for the reference SPS
design. SPS requirements for conventional materials and services are large, 49
and the size of these requirements is reflected in Issue i in Table 3.4.
Increased production will be required from industrial sectors such as metal
mining and steel production, which have relatively high accident rates
and levels of occupational exposure to hazardous physical and chemical agents.
In addition, increased public risks will occur through release of hazardous
environmental pollutants. Incremental increases in both public and occupa-
tional health effects resulting from meeting SPS demands for conventional
31
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Flg. 3.8. Flow Diagram of Health and Safety Issues
of the Satellite Power System
materlals and services are expected to account for a significant portion of
total SPS health impacts.
A high degree of uncertainty is attached to health and safety impacts
__-- LJ
of other identified issues in Fig. 3.8 and Table 3.4. u=_px_= L,_ ULL_=L_=ILL
ty, several issues appear to pose nonnegliglble threats to public and occupa-
tional health and safety. Other issues are less significant because of the
availability of mitigation strategies such as use of safety devices and system
planning.
Issue 8, chronic public exposure to the power beam, warrants both
a hlgh severity designation (A) and a high uncertainty ranking (3). The
impact on human health from long-term exposure to low-level microwave radia-
tion (<i mW/cm 2) is not well understood. Studies suggest that chronic
exposure may have teratologlc, reproductive, genetic, immunologic_ and neuro-
logic effects. 50 The level of exposure needed to manifest an effect is not
certain. A threshold level may not exist.
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Scatter and reradiation from grating lobes are the primary SPS-related
sources of public exposure to low levels of microwave radiation. The SPS
reference system may, depending on proximity of rectenna sites to high-density
population areas, expose significant numbers of people to low-level micro-
waves. 48
Issue i0 -- acute public exposure to microwaves -- addresses issues
such as unscheduled excursions of the power beam above the design density of
23 mW/cm 2 and inadvertent or surreptitious focusing of one or more beams
outside of rectenna boundaries. For comparison, the OSHA standard prohibits
excursions above 25 mW/cm 2 and 8-hour average exposure above _ i0 mW/cm 2 in
the workplace. The current reference design includes a retrodirective phase-
control system, an encoded pilot beam, and a ground-based beam-detection
system. Thus the probability of acute exposure of the public is expected to
be very low. 48 However, this potential issue deserves continued concernj
because details of the final workingdesign are still highly uncertain. The
combination of low risk (as currently perceived) and high uncertainty is
consistent with a (B) severity rating and a (3) uncertainty rating.
Issue 2, the impacts of production of photovoltalc cells in sufficient
quantity to meet SPS demand, is of high uncertainty (level 3) due to the
experimental nature of current production. The SPS reference design includes
a gallium aluminum arsenide (GaAIAs) photovoltaic cell option, for which there
are fewer production characterization data than for commercially available
silicon cells. Since components of GaAIAs cells are toxlc, 45 and since
exposure levels to occupational personnel and to the public are potentially
significant during the production cycle, Issue 2 has been given an (A)
severity rating.
Issues 3 and 4, both of which have been given (A) severity ratings
and high uncertalnty ratings, relate to the public health and safety impacts
of transportation of personnel and materials to and from GEO and LEO. It is
estimated that a single catastrophic event involving propellant or guidance
system malfunction of a transport vehicle (Issue 3) could result in as
many as 1,000 deaths. Noise and atmospheric emissions produced by transport
vehicles (Issue 4), will have impacts of a more continuous, less immediate
nature. Noise from launch and flight operations may result in high annoyance
levels and potentially hazardous structural damage in the vicinity of the
35
launch area and along the flight path. Atmospheric emissions, potentially
toxic themselves, may also have indirect effects on public health if they
alter the upper atmosphere so as to produce changes in radiation and weather
patterns. 51
Other identified issues received low severity ratings due to potential
mitigation strategies that could keep health risks at low levels. These
four issues, 5, 6, 7, and 9, involve occupational risk where procedures such
as personnel screening, use of safety equipment, limiting exposure periods,
and continuous maintenance of SPS system components would minimize risk. 51
3.5 FUSIONPOWERSYSTEM
3.5.1 System Description
A demonstration-size nuclear fusion power reactor is projected to be at
least 20 years from completion, and an operating commercial unit will require
an additional i0 to 15 years. 57,58 These predictions assume that solutions
can be found to difficult technical questions that continue to hamper develop-
ment of controlled nuclear fusion for commercial power generation.
Selecting a representative fusion system is difficult since it is
not possible to identify the specific configuration a working reactor will
take. The two research directions under active investigation are magnetic
confinement as typified by the Tokamak design and inertial confinement using
high-power lasers.59, 60 To date most effort has been directed at the Tokamak
concept, 61 and it would appear that the Tokamak design has the best chance
of becoming the initial working design. Thus, the Tokamak design has been
selected as the reference system in the present analysis.
Figure 3.9 illustrates a Tokamak fusion power reactor coupled through
an intermediate heat exchanger to a conventional steam cycle. The primary
side of this heat exchange extracts the heat delivered by neutrons from the
fusion reactor to the fusion blanket.
All of the fusion designs currently under consideration would utilize
a deuterium/tritium (D/T) fuel cycle. It has been estimated that a fusion
system fueled by the earth's natural resource of deuterium could supply
the present world power demand for the next 64 x 109 years. 62
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A number of fusion reactions are possible, but the one that is most
likely to be used in initial fusion reactor designs 57 is as follows:
2 3 4 1
1D + 1T + plasma energy ÷ 2He + On + fusion energy
(I0 keV) (17,600 keV)
The products of this reaction are a 14.l-meV neutron and a 3.5-meV
alpha particle. As the neutron is slowed down, its kinetic energy is given
up in the form of heat in the blanket region of the reactor adjacent to the
plasma. The energy from the alpha particle is used to maintain the plasma
temperature. Because there is no significant source of tritium on earth, the
required tritium supply would have to be bred from lithium (Li) in the follow-
ing reactions:
3 4Li + 10n ÷ 1T + 2He + 4.8 meV
_Li + _n ÷ 3 4 11T + 2He + On
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These reactions would take place within the reactor during normal
operations, and since more tritium is produced then is burned up, an excess
of fuel would be generated.
To start up a fusion power plant, an initial charge of deuterium
and tritium will be needed; after that a continuous supply of deuterium and
lithium at about one kilogram per day will be required. An estimated 3 x 105
kg of lithium will be required per 1,000 MWe/year.57
3.5.2 Summary of Health and Safety Issues
The identified major health and safety issues are illustrated in Fig.
3.10 and summarized in Table 3.5. The health and safety issues of a fusion
system, like those of a fission system, can be divided between those with and
those without a radioactive nature. Safety issues are primarily those associ-
ated with hazards of fuel and component preparation, transportation, and
general occupational experience during plant operations.
Fusion is often compared favorably to fission as a self-limiting
process without the problem of radioactive waste disposal. 59 This statement
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is only partially true. Although the fusion reaction will not release waste
products from fuel use, it does not preclude radioactive wastes from non-fuel-
system components such as activation products in the first wall of the
reactor. Even though the reaction would cease if a malfunction were to
occur, it would be possible for the vacuum vessel to fail during operation and
to release tritium.
Tritium is the principal radiological concern in the fusion system. 63
This radionuclide is considered a relatively low-level hazard because of its
low-energy beta emission and short biological half-life. However, release of
a large quantity of tritium as a result of system failure must be guarded
against.
A more localized yet greater concern during mechanical failure would
be a liquid-lithium spill or fire. Such a situation could conceivably release
energy equivalent to 1.5 million liters of fuel oil. 61
An issue unique to the fusion system is the biological effect of
high magnetic fields. Studies are presently under way to determine the nature
and extent of responses to long-term exposure. 68,69 It appears likely that
electromagnetic radiation effects will be limited to the portion of the plant
population directly exposed to the field.
Other health issues related to occupational exposures include toxic
exposures during fuel processing and fabrication of system components.
Hydrogen su!f_de exposure during deuterium extraction and acid leaching of
lithium ore can result in health impacts to workers in such operations.
Beryllium, an identified workplace hazard, will be used in the fusion vessel
blanket for enhanced neutron production. Workers likely to be exposed to this
metal or its compounds during fabrication must be protected from adverse
response. 63
Issues of a general safety nature include accidents and exposure to
toxic chemicals and radiation hazards during lithium ore extraction and
processing, system fabrication, plant construction and demolition, fuel and
component transportation, and waste disposal. These activities would be
expected to exhibit impacts similar to fission systems except for fuel trans-
port and waste disposal.
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A final issue that does not lend itself to quantification is the impact
of fusion technology on nuclear safeguards. Unlike fission technology, which
could conceivably be diverted to produce material for nuclear weapons, fusion
has a nearly self-contained fuel cycle and nonvolatile radioactive waste
products. 59 As such, a fusion system would not produce nuclear materials from
which weapons could be fabricated. However, through plasma confinement
techniques, fusion technology could aid in the spread of knowledge pertinent
to weapons development, a byproduct of energy research with an indirect safety
impact.
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4 COMPARATIVEENERGYSYSTEMASSESSMENT
This section contains a comparison of the impacts of the five energy
generation technologies. Table 4.1 provides, for each of the systems, the
total quantifiable expected deaths per 1,000 MW/yr of power generation, and
the deaths per year in each issue category. Also included is the number of
unquantifiable issues for each system.
Table 4. i. Summaryof Quantifiable Health and Safety
Impacts and Numberof Unquantifiable Issues
for SPSand Four Alternative Technologiesa
Category of
Impact Fission
Terrestrial
Coal Photovoltaic SPS Fusion
Total
Public
Occupational
Long Term
Intermediate-
Termc
Short Term
Accidents
Disease
Radiation
0.65 5.84 1.46 0.31 0.004
A(3),B(1) A(2),B(1) A(2) A(4),B(5) A(4),B(6)
0.55 3.70 0.03 _-b __
A(3),B(1) A(1),B(1) A(2) A(4),B(1) A(1),B(3)
0.i0 2.14 1.43 0.31 0.004
A(2),B(1) A(1) A(2) A(1),B(4) A(4),B(3)
0.6459 5.75 1.33 -- 0.0002
A(1) A(2),B(1) A(1) A(2),B(4) A(2),B(5)
B(1)
A(2)
0.25
A(3), B(1)
0.39d
A(3),B(1)
0.92
4.30
1.54
A(2),B(1)
0.0023d
0.13 0.31 0.004
A(2) A(2),B(2) A(1),B(1)
A(1) A(1)
1.43 0.3 0.004
A(1) A(2),B(3) A(1)
0.03 0.01 --
A(2) A(3),B(3) A(1),B(1)
A(1),B(3) e A(2),B(5) d
aFigures shown are expected deaths/year over 30-year plant lifetime, unless
otherwise specified. Numbers in parentheses are numbers of issues identified
in (A) and (B) severity categories.
bEllipses indicate unquantified or negligible issues.
COccurring during raw material extraction, processing, and fabrication for
component production and system deactivation. Estimates are total per
1,000 MW generation.
dlonizing radiation.
eMicrowave radiation.
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For the most direct comparison - total quantifiable deaths per year -
systems in a more advanced stage of development generally exhibit higher
impact or risk levels. Ranking strictly on the basis of quantifiable death
risk may, however, lead to misleading conclusions because of unknowneffects
from poorly quantified or unquantified issues. The difficulty is illustrated
in Fig. 4.1, which shows that there is more uncertainty about the quantified
health and safety hazards of the terrestrial photovoltaic and satellite power
systems than there is about the quantified hazards of the other three systems
(see top half of figure). For example, the major quantified impacts of the
terrestrial photovoltaic system are largely due to occupational hazards from
construction and maintenance of the large arrays of solar collectors, and
these estimates have no historical basis as far as manpowerrequirements are
concerned.
Figure 4.1 also provides a perspective on the potential role of unquan-
tified issues by illustrating the number of these issues for each technology.
The SPS and fusion systems, which have the lowest level of quantifiable
impacts, have the largest number of unquantifiable risks to health and safety.
On the basis of quantifiable effects on the public (nonoccupational)
health and safety, a similar higher impact level is estimated for the more
developed or near-term technologies, as shown in Fig. 4.2. According to these
public hazards estimtes, fusion and the satellite power system would appear to
be the two least hazardous systems, but, as the bottom half of the figure
shows, the numbers of unquantifiable public-impact issues are greatest for
fusion and SPS and least for coal.
Figure 4.3 shows the impacts of component production and facility
construction, averaged over a 30-year plant lifetime. In this comparison, the
solar technologies have the greatest impact because their labor requirements
are greater than those of the coal and light water reactor technologies.
As stated previously, in terms of the public perception of their
significance, it may be unrealistic to evaluate catastrophic events on the
basis of average risk of death per year of plant operation. A major factor in
the determination of the future viability of a new technology may be the
real or perceived potential for the occurrence of a catastrophic event
independently from that of more-continuous low-rlsk events. For this reason,
this assessment identifies the potential for catastrophic events as a separate
!
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evaluation. For the systems considered, potential catastrophic events iden-
tified are:
Combined-cycle coal power system
- none identified
Fission power system
- Core meltdown, breach of containment
- Plutonium diversion, terrorist bomb
Terrestrial photovoltaic power system
- none identified
Satellite power system
- Space vehicle crash in urban area
Fusion power system
- Acute radiation exposure from explosive rupture
of reactor vessel
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APPENDIXA
FISSION: ISSUEIDENTIFICATION
ANDEVALUATION
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TECHNOLOGY:Light Water Reactor
ISSUENO. i
PROCESS:Uranium ore extraction and milling.
IMPACTCATEGORY:Accidental injuries resulting from workplace hazards,
continuous risk during facility operation.
PROBLEMSOURCE: The mine environment -- irrespective of the product being
extracted -- has historically been identified with clearly defined physical
hazards. Underground uranium mining utilizes heavy machinery, explosives,
and high-power electrical equipment, generally in confined, poorly lighted
work areas. A continuous hazard also exists from rock slides and roof falls.
Surface processing of the ore also presents opportunities for adverse health
interactions from the requirement of large-scale materials-handling activ-
ities.
HEALTHAND SAFETYIMPACT: Mine accidents occur regularly during the work
year and result in a range of disabilities and dismembering injuries from
falls, human error, machine failure, and unanticipated rock-fall hazards.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: Occupational risks from physical hazards during
mining and milling operations are roughly comparable to those of the coal
industry. Over the six-year interval between 1964 and 1969, the injury rates
per million person hours were 1.02 for fatal* and 39.2 for nonfatal accidental
injuries as compared to 1.01 and 42.6 for the coal industry during the same
period.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: The future extent of worker exposure to
extraction and mllling operations is highly dependent on advances in the
industry and availability of specific grades of ore. Lower grade ores will
require greater hazard exposure.
SEVERITYRATING: i
UNCERTAINTYRATING: i
REFERENCE:12
*Estimated impact 0.05 to 0.2 fatality per yr per 1,000 MWe
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TECHNOLOGY:Light Water Reactor
ISSUENO. 2
PROCESS:Uraniumore extraction and milling.
IMPACTCATEGORY:Lung cancer from exposure to radon and other sources of
low-level radiation by occupational population, continuous during plant
operation.
PROBLEMSOURCE:Underground mining of uranium can expose the miner to dust
containing naturally-occurring radionuclides. These dusts, together with
radon gas, 222Rn, pose an occupational hazard to the miner. To a lesser
degree this hazard exists during milling as well.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: Increased rates of lung cancer have been documented
in underground uranium miners. Evidence supports the relationship between
exposure to alpha-emitting radionuclides such as 222Rn and induction of
lung tumors in man. Dose-response relationship: 0.63/106 person/yr/rem
excess cases of lung cancer in U.S. u_anium miners between 1951 and 1971.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIHATE: During the past 20 years more than i00 uranium
miners have died from lung cancer in the U.S.; 500-1,500 miners who were
exposed prior to establishment of occupational safety standards may die from
similar radiation-related disease. Estimated impact, 0.001-0.I fatality per
year per 1,000-MWeplant.
MAJORUNCERTAINTYREQUIRINGR&D: Radiation exposures before establishment
of national standards are not known precisely; they have been estimated
at several thousand times the present exposure limits.
REGULATORYSTATUS: International Commission on Radiological Protection
(ICRP) 1959 limit: 0.3 x 10-8 _ Ci of 222Rn/ml of air, maximumpermissible
concentration. U.S. exposure limit, 4 months of occupational exposure per
year (10-7 _ Ci of 222Rn/ml of air).
SEVERITYRATING: 2
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 2
REFERENCE:Ii
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TECHNOLOGY:Light Water Reactor
ISSUENO. 3
PROCESS:U308conversion, UF6 enrichment, UO2 fabrication.
IMPACTCATEGORY:Workplace accidental injury; continuous risk during plant
operation.
PROBLEMSOURCE: The industrial processes required to take milled U308
from its natural state to enriched UO2 in reactor fuel bundles permit
the possible exposure to toxic fumes and physical hazards in the workplace.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: The occupational population is at risk of serious
physical injury from chemical and thermal hazards. Initial conversion of
U308to U(N03)6 can expose Workers to an explosive hazard.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: Occupational injury during uranium processing:
0.003-0.2 fatal and 0.568 nonfatal injuries associated with the fuel require-
ment of a 1,000-MWeplant with a 75%load factor.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: Specific data are needed on the work
force accident experience related to the fuel preparation activities of the
nuclear fuel cycle.
REGULATORYSTATUS: Both NRCand OSHAregulations cover various aspects of
the workplace throughout the nuclear industry.
SEVERITYRATING: 2
UNCERTAINTYRATING: i
REFERENCE:13
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TECHNOLOGY:Light Water Reactor
ISSUENO. 4
PROCESS:Fuel processing; conversion, enrichment, fabrication.
IMPACTCATEGORY:Public and occupational exposure to low-level radiation;
continuous risk during plant operation.
PROBLEMSOURCE:Low-level radiation exposure is associated with all phases
of the nuclear fuel cycle. The purpose of fuel processing is to bring the
U-235 content of the fuel up from about 0.7% in its natural state to 3 or
4% in the enriched fuel. Both the fabricated fuel product and process wastes
(including mine tailings) present possible sources of radiation exposure. The
quantity of such wastes is expected to increase with expansion of the nuclear
industry.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: The health impacts generally associated with low-
level radiation exposure are cancer and genetic defects. These impacts
are classified as delayed effects in that they occur long after the initial
exposure. A general latency period for most cancers associated with radiation
is about 15 years. Genetic effects occur in the offspring of the exposed
individual.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: A Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation
(BEIR) report estimates for low-level radiation effects are calculated at
180 x i0 -° cancer deaths per rem and 150 x 10-6 eventual genetic defects per
rem exposure of the entire population. Estimated occupational impacts:
0.003 - 0.033 occupational fatality/yr; 0.0003 fatality/yr/l,O00 MWeamong
general public.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: No data exist on radiation-induced genetic
defects in man. All evidence has been derived from animal experimentation.
REGULATORYSTATUS: The ICRP recommendsdose limits for the general public:
genetic dose < 5 rem from all sources over the normal time period for child-
bearing.
SEVERITYRATING: 2
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 2
REFERENCES:7, 14
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TECHNOLOGY:Light Water Reactor
ISSUENO. 5
PROCESS: Fuel processing; conversion, enrichment, fabrication; continuous
risk during plant operations.
IMPACTCATEGORY: Public, occupational exposure to HF, F2 and fluorides.
PROBLEMSOURCE: Increasing the 235U content of fuel (enrichment) requires
U308 concentrate to be converted to UF6. This step is accomplished by hydro-
fluorination with HF and F2. Process emissions contain fluorides.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: Hydrogen fluoride is a known eye and lung irri-
tant. Fluorosis and chronic fluorine toxicity can result in degenerative
bone lesions and osteofluorosis.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: Fluoride concentrations in forage in the
vicinity of UF6 production facilities have been measured as high as i0 ppm.
The chemical hazard to humans from HF outweighs the radiolo$ical hazard of
exposure to UF6. Exposure to levels of HF exceeding 400 mg/m_ for short time
periods can cause death; 25 mg/m3 can result in severe lung damage.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: Accidents and explosions accompanied by
fire in chemical process equipment could release hydrogen fluoride.
REGULATORYSTATUS: 1977 threshold limit value for airborne fluorides in the
workplace: 2.5 mg/m3 for fluorine, 2 mg/m3 as a time-weighted average.
SEVERITYRATING: A
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 3
REFERENCE:9
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TECHNOLOGY:Light Water Reactor
ISSUENO. 6
PROCESS:Transportation requirements.
IMPACTCATEGORY: Injury to the general public resulting from transport
requirements of the fuel cycle; continuous risk during plant operation.
PROBL_ISOURCE:Transportation accidents occur over a range of frequency and
severity. Most accidents occur at low vehicle speeds. Severe accidents
generally involve somecombination of impact, puncture, and fire. Even if the
hazardous nature of the cargo is not a factor, accidents often result in
injury. Transport requirements exist throughout the nuclear fuel cycle.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: The general public and transportation workers are
both at risk of transportation-related accidents. Accidents occur whether
shipments contain hazardous materials or not, but accidents involving compo-
nents of the nuclear fuel cycle contain toxic chemical and radiological health
hazards as well.
QUANTITATIVE_IPACTESTIMATE: Accident rates: truck 1.5/106 km, rail 8.1/106
km. To date there have been no injuries or deaths of a radiological nature
due to the transportation of nuclear materials. The DOTestimates that 20 to
30 accidents involving transportation of nuclear materials occur each year.
In 1972 injury rates were estimated for trucks at 0.65 injury and 0.03 death
per accident; for rail transportation, 2.4 injuries and 0.26 death per acci-
dent. Estimated impact is 0.002-0.036 fatality and 0.14-0.45 nonfatal injury
and disease occurrence per year per 1,000 MWefor transportation workers and
0.0003-0.002 fatalities for the public.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: Risk analysis of transportation require-
ments of the nuclear fuel cycle is based on theoretical hazards.
REGULATORYSTATUS: Transportation of nuclear materials is subject to NRC
regulations and to DOThazardous materials regulations.
SEVERITYRATING: 2
UNCERTAINTYRATING: i
REFERENCES:13, 15-18
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TECHNOLOGY:Light Water Reactor
ISSUENO. 7, 7"
PROCESS:Reactor plant operations (7), Decommission(7").
IMPACTCATEGORY:General health impacts related to plant operations.
PROBL_ SOURCE: Routine operation of a power reactor requires a manpower
level of about 0.18 employee/MWe(180 personnel per 1,000-MWeunit). Daily
work activities related to operation, maintenance, and repair of the facility
expose workers to a typical range of industrial accidents. The presence of
nuclear materials presents an additional hazard. Release of such materials
exposes the work force and general public to a continuous level of low-dose
radiat ion.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: The spectrum of workplace injury in the nuclear
power station is assumedto be similar to that observed in oil- and gas-fired
stations of equal size. Exposure to low-level radiation results from daily
workplace activities.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE:Accident rates due to reactor operations activ-
ities are estimated at 0.024-0.117 fatal and 1.3 nonfatal injuries per annual
operating requirements of a I,O00-MWeunit. Estimated public impact from
routine emissions of radionuclides is on the order of 0.05 fatalities per MW
year.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: Specific accidental injury data occurring
during routine plant operation, further experimental data relating low-level
radiation exposure to disease states in humans.
REGULATORYSTATUS: The Nuclear Regulatory Commissionrequires that no member
of the public receive a radiation dose greater than 5 rem/yr from power
plant emissions. Maximumpermissible occupational dose for workers in nuclear
facilities is 12 rem/yr.
SEVERITYRATING: Operations 2 DecommissionB
UNCERTAINTY.............. ___ o n..... __^_
REFERENCES:12, 17, 18
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TECHNOLOGY:Light Water Reactor
ISSUENO. 8
IMPACTCATEGORY: Public and occupational risk during reaction operation.
PROBLEMSOURCE: Given the appropriate set of conditions, it is possible
to conjecture situations in which an appreciable fraction of the radioactivity
produced by a reactor would be released in an uncontrolled manner. Such
an accident would cause the reactor core to melt down and release the con-
tained radioactive componentsof the fuel.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: Immediate and latent health effects (acute radia-
tion sickness and eventual cancer deaths) would be expected as a result of a
catastrophic accident at a nuclear facility.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: Worst-case estimates for a single accident
are 3,500 fatalities from acute radiation sickness and an eventual 45,000
cancer deaths. Suchan accident has an estimated probability of occurrence of
about once in a million years (0.02-0.56 fatality/year).
MAJORUNCERTAINTYREQUIRINGR&D: Impact estimates are based on the small
numberof operational hours of experience with large power reactors.
REGULATORYSTATUS: NRCreactor-licensing regulations specify safe operating
procedures and conditions.
SEVERITYRATING: A
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 3
REFERENCES:17, 19
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TECHNOLOGY:Light Water Reactor
ISSUENO. 9
PROCESS:Fuel reprocessing.
IMPACTCATEGORY: Exposure to low-level radiation; continuous risk during
plant operation.
PROBLEMSOURCE: The objective of nuclear fuel reprocessing is to recover
plutonium (produced in the reactor) and unburned uranium for reuse in the
fuel cycle. Activities within the reprocessing step can result in public and
worker exposure to fission products.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: Because of the nature and quantity of the material
handled during fuel reprocessing, worker contamination with radioactive
products is possible. Increased public and occupational exposure to such
radiation would increase carcinogenic and genetic health risks.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACT ESTIMATE: Currently there are no operating fuel-
reprocessing facilities in the U.S. However, estimates indicate that impacts from
low-level radiation exposure would be approximately 0.006 death per year/l,000
MWfor occupational exposures and 0.009 death per year/l,000 MWfor public
exposures.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: The extent of workplace exposure, espe-
cially during accidental radiation release, needs to be quantified. Future
levels of facility operations are unknown.
REGULATORYSTATUS: Processing plants are governed by NRC licensing pro-
cedures.
SEVERITYRATING: 3
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 2
REFERENCE: 15
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TECHNOLOGY:Light Water Reactor
ISSUENO. i0
PROCESS:Radioactive waste dlsposal.
IMPACTCATEGORY:General population delayed response to low-level radiation;
long term risk during and after plant operation.
PROBLEMSOURCE: High-level wastes accumulate as a result of fuel reproc-
essing. The principal hazard presented by disposal of material is that it
may eventually contact and contaminate ground water, move through aquifers,
and eventually reach drinking water supplies.
HEALTHANDSAFETY_PACT: All segments of the population would be at risk
from the hazard presented by leached radloactive-wastes and their potential
carcinogenic action.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: Duration times for hazards associated with
radioactive wastes range from 103 to 106 years. Impacts are estimated at
0.006 occupational death/yr and 0.0003 - 0.0009 public death/yr per 1,000
_fW.
MAJORUNCERTAINTYREQUIRINGR&D: Ability to predict material or geological
stability over containment times necessary for long-lived components
REGULATORYSTATUS: NRCregulations require conversion and storage of radio-
active wastes and licensing of deep geologic repositories.
SEVERITYRATING: 3
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 2
REFERENCE:20
57
TECHNOLOGY:Light Water Reactor
ISSUENO. ii
PROCESS: Safeguarding of reprocessed fuel, diversion of fissile materials.
IMPACTCATEGORY: General population safety risk during plant operation.
PROBLEMSOURCE: Plutonium is a by-product of the reprocessing of spent
nuclear fuel. Reactor-grade plutonium can be used to fabricate low-yield
nuclear weapons. Airborne plutonium is also hazardous because of its recog-
nized carcinogenic acivity.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: It is generally accepted that an explosive device
fabricated from diverted nuclear materials would have sufficient power to
destroy a city block. Insoluble PuO2 as a fine particulate aerosol can be
deposited deep in the lungs and initiate bronchiogenic lung cancers.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: Detonated within a modern skyscraper, an
explosive device capable of destroying a city block could cause 50,000 civil-
ian casualties through blast effect alone. A pound of plutonium released in
a metropolitan center would typically result in 25 eventual cancer deaths.
MAJORUNCERTAINTYREQUIRINGR&D: There is no concensas on the level of risk
associated with unlawful diversion of reprocessed nuclear materials and their
eventual criminal misuse.
REGULATORYSTATUS: NRCsafeguard procedures and regulations for processing
of spent fuel are continuations of programs for improving security initiated
by the Atomic Energy Commission(AEC).
SEVERITYRATING: A
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 3
REFERENCE:7
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TECIINOLOGY:Light Water Reactor
ISSUENO. 12
PROCESS:Rawmaterial acquisition.
IMPACTCATEGORY:Occupational safety during plant operation.
PROBL_I SOURCE: Large amounts of concrete, steel, and other conventional
materials are needed for construction of light water reactors. Workers
involved in these activities are at relatively high accident risk compared to
those in other occupations.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: Fatalities from occupational accidents during
raw material acquisition are estimated to be _0.001/i,000 MW.
MAJORUNCERTAINTYREQUIRINGR&D:
raw material acquisition.
SEVERITYRATING: 2
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 1
REFERENCE:8
Precise evaluation of manpowerdemandsof
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TECHNOLOGY:Light Water Reactor
ISSUENO. 13
PROCESS:Plant construction.
IMPACTCATEGORY:Occupational safety.
PROBLEMSOURCE: Reactor system fabrication and plant assembly will require
a substantial commitment of manpower. The construction trades have tradi-
tionally had higher than average injury rates compared to industrial opera-
tions in general. Activities related to the construction of a nuclear plant
can be assumed to demonstrate injury rates comparable to those for other
heavy-construction projects and industrial manufacturing operations.
QUANTITATIVE_IPACTESTIMATE: Construction of a I,O00-MWnuclear power plant
is estimated to result in 0.002-0.004 fatality as a result of industrial
and construction activities, prorated over a 30-year plant lifetime.
MAJORUNCERTAINTYREQUIRINGR&D: The actual nature of heavy industrial opera-
tions for system fabrication and plant construction must be evaluated more
precisely.
SEVERITYRATING: 2
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 1
REFERENCE:8
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APPENDIXB
COMBINED-CYCLE COAL SYSTEM: ISSUE
IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION
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TECHNOLOGY:
ISSUENO. 1
PROCESS: Underground coal mining.
IMPACT CATEGORY: Occupational health:
plant operation.
Comblned-Cycle Coal, Low-Btu Gaslfler, Open-Cycle Gas Turbine
coal dust inhalation continuous during
PROBLEM SOURCE: Airborne coal dust and cold, damp atmosphere in mines.
HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACT: Coal workers' pneumoconiosls (CWP) results after
about about 15 years of coal dust buildup in the lungs. In progressive
massive flhrosls (PMF), an advanced form of CWP, fibers are developed in the
lung tissue as a reaction to the coal dust and continue to develop without
further exposure to dust. A 1970 survey showed that 10% of miners had CWP and
one-third of those had PMF. 26 The cold, damp conditions in mines are also
associated with high rates of chronic bronchitis and emphysema.
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ESTIMATE: For the reference 1,000-MWe plant using
3.30 x 109 kg of coal per year, it is estimated that there will be 0.36-0.72
death per year and 14.1-18.5 disabilities per year from pulmonary disease. 24
MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES REQUIRING R&D: Due to the long latency period for devel-
opment of CWP and other mlne-related health effects, the actual impact of
recent regulations on coal dust levels is uncertain.
REGULATORY STATUS: The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969
limits the average concentration of resplrable dust in mine air to 2 mg/m 3.
In 1969 the average dust concentration in U.S. mines was reported as
7 mgFm3. 25
SEVERITY RATING: l
UNCERTAINTY RATING: l
REFERENCES: 24-26
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Comblned-Cycle Coal, Low-Btu Gasifler, Open-Cycle Gas TurbineTECHNOLOGY:
ISSUE NO. 2
PROCESS: Underground and surface coal mining.
IMPACT CATEGORY: Occupational safety: mining accidents. Continuous risk
during plant operation.
PROBLEM SOURCE: Physical hazards associated with underground mining opera-
tions, e.g., operation of heavy machinery, often in poorly lighted and con-
fined areas; use of explosives; rock slides; roof falls; high-voltage
electrical wiring.
HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACT: Disabling or fatal injury, dismemberment,
electrocution.
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ESTIMATE: The following estimates were obtained from
Ref. 24 for the reference 1,000-MWe plant using 3.30 x 109 kg of coal per
year:
Type of 95% Confidence
Incident Number/Year Interval
Underground Mining
Deaths 1.31 1.19- 1.45
Injuries i00 86.4 -114
Surface Mining
Deaths 0.36 0.33- 0.44
Injuries 18.9 16.3 - 21.8
MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES REQUIRING R&D: Impact of large influx of new, inexperi-
enced miners accompanying increased coal demand; increased mechanization; new
mining techniques.
REGULATORY STATUS: Occupational safety regulations enforced by Mining
Enforcement and Safety Administration under the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969 as amended in 1977.
SEVERITY RATING: i
UNCERTAINTY RATING: 1
REFERENCE: 24
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TECHNOLOGY:
ISSUENO. 3
PROCESS:Transportation of coal.
IMPACTCATEGORY:Public safety:
risk during plant operation.
Combined-Cycle Coal, Low-Btu Gasifier, Open-Cycle Gas Turbine
railroad crossing accidents. Continuous
PROBLEM SOURCE: Over 60% of recorded deaths associated with railway freight
haulage are caused by railroad crossing accidents. 27 The remaining 40%
occur primarily during switching and yard operations, which can generally be
avoided by coal-unit trains.
HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACT: On the basis of national statistics, there are
2.5 deaths/lO 9 ton-miles. 24
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ESTIMATE: Assuming the above accident rates and an
average coal transport distance of 300 miles, 28 the reference I,O00-MWe plant
Using 3.30 x 109 kg of coal annually would have 2.7 deaths and 13 injuries
per year associated with coal transport.
MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES REQUIRING R&D: Accident rate estimates are adapted
from haulage of all national railway freight and may vary according to train
length, distance transported, population density along transport routes, and
existence and maintenance of crossing-safety devices.
REGULATORY STATUS: No regulations specific to coal transport.
SEVERITY RATING: i
UNCERTAINTY RATING: i
REFERENCES: 24, 27, 28
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TECHNOLOGY:
ISSUENO. 4
PROCESS: General plant construction.
IMPACT CATEGORY: Occupational safety:
plant construction phase.
Comblned-Cycle Coal, Low-Btu Gaslfler, Open-Cycle Gas Turbine
construction accidents limited to
REFERENCES: 23, 28
UNCERTAINTY RATING: i
PROBLEM SOURCE: Physical hazards associated with major construction sites,
e.g., work at high elevations, operation of heavy machinery, assembly of large
unit components, hlgh-voltage wiring.
HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACT: Deaths, disabling injuries, electrocution.
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ESTIMATE: The direct manual field labor required for
plant construction is estimated at 7 million hours. 23 Using 1975 data for all
contract construction, estimates of impact for this field labor are i.i deaths
and 550 inJurles. 28 Averaged over a 30-year plant lifetime, the estimates are
0.036 death and 18 injurles/l,000 HW/yr.
MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES REQUIRING R&D: Field labor requirements may vary from
estimates, although experience in construction of related facilities minimizes
the expected discrepancies.
REGULATORY STATUS: Construction site safety is regulated by OSHA standards.
SEVERITY RATING: 2
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TECHNOLOGY:Combined-Cycle Coal, Low-Btu Gaslfler, Open-Cycle Gas Turbine
ISSUENO. 5
PROCESS: Plant operation: coal preprocessing, gasification, gas cleanup,
steam cycle.
IMPACTCATEGORY:Occupational health: inhalation and skin contact of toxic
and carcinogenic substances; continuous risk during plant operation.
PROBLEMSOURCE: Potential inhalation of fugitive emissions of gases and
particulates formed in these processes; during maintenance, skin exposure to
formed sludges and condensed products inside the components; during disposal,
skin exposure to solid and liquid wastes that contain condensed or absorbed
toxic substances
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: CWPfrom coal dust; coal dust fires; cancers
from inhalation and exposure to certain polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons and
nitrogen-containing compounds; toxicity and lung irritant effect of various
sulfur, hydrocarbon, and trace element compounds.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTI_IATE: Lack of experience with gasification systems
makes estimation difficult. The following health effects were estimated for
workers in a pilot coal-converslon plant from 1952 to the late 1960s:
"In reporting the clinical effects in a group of 359 coal hydro-
generation workers who were examined regularly over a 5-year period,
it was found that the exposure of these menvaried from a few months
to 23 years, and all of the (skin) lesions of significance were
discovered in those workmen with less than i0 years exposure.
...the incidence of cancer in these menwas between 16 and 37 times
that reported in the literature. '°33
It should be pointed out that the in-plant levels in this pilot plant may
vary significantly from those existing in a modern gasification plant.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: In-plant concentration levels, synergistic
effects of multiagent exposure, effects of long-term, low-level exposure.
REGULATORYSTATUS: OSHAstandards have been promulgated for the following
materials known to be present in coal gasification plants: As, benzene,
Be, Cd, CO2, CS2, Cr, H2S, phenol, and V. Additional standards are antic-
ipated.
SEVERITYRATING: A
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 3
REFERENCES:30-35
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TEG_NOLOGY:Combined-Cycle Coal, Low-Btu Gaslfier, Open-Cycle Gas Turbine
ISSUENO. 6
PROCESS:Power plant operation.
IMPACTCATEGORY:Public health: atmospheric emissions (near field, non-
radioactive) continuous during plant operation.
PROBLEMSOURCE: Coal contains numerous noncarbon constituents in various
concentrations. These constituents can be converted to gaseous forms during
gasification and combustion phases and emitted from the stack. Of these, SOx,
NOx, and particulates from ash have been the major focus of environmental
control regulations, and for this issue analysis it is assumedthat SOx and
NOx are emitted at levels equal to those currently permitted in gases from
fossil-fuel electrical generation plants. Particulates can be expected to be
reduced to nearly negligible levels by the low-Btu gas-cleanup system.
Production and emission of hydrocarbons classified as polycyclic organic
material (POM)are of concern because of their toxic and carcinogenic proper-
ties; 36 however, emission levels have not been established for this type of
process. Similarly, trace components of coal, such as Cd, Hg, As, and U may
be emitted -- in particular, those such as Hg, which are volatilized and not
collected with other particulates. However, the levels of emissions of these
componentsand their possible pathways to humansare uncertain.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: Airborne effluents from coal combustion have
been associated with increases in both the incidence of new cases and the
mortality from existing cases of emphysema,bronchitis, asthma, pneumonia,
influenza, and malignant diseases. Sulfur emissions, particularly after
atmospheric transformation to sulfates, have been shown to correlate statis-
tically with increased mortality and morbidity, although the physical mech-
anisms of the impacts are not well understood. These correlations, as used in
the quantitative impact estimates below, should be viewed as indicators of
complex mechanismsinvolving other pollutants as well.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: For a reference 1,000-MWe plant located in
the upper Ohio River Valley with SO2 emissions of .086 kg/109 J (0.2 ib/106
Btu) input, the estimated mortality impact is approximately 0.35 excess death
per l06 persons within an 80-kin radius, 24 or 1.05 excess deaths/yr assuming
a typical population of 3,000,000 within that radius. The 80% confidence
interval is estimated as 0-17 deaths. 24 Latency effects and changing popula-
tion age distribution maymake it necessary to increase these estimates by 25%
by the year 2,000. 37 Currently available long-range transport models indicate
potential low-level exposure to a much larger population outside the 80-km
radius, with an associated cumulative impact one to two orders of magnitude
larger, if a linear dose-response function is assumed.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: Characteristics and dose-response of
specific pollutants emitted from combined-cycle plant, atmospheric transforma-
tion of pollutants, and effect of low-level exposures. The importance of
individual dose response and impact resistance are also not well understood.
REGULATORYSTATUS: The EPA has recently proposed new standards38 requiring
90% SO2 control on a rolling monthly average basis for all fuels, with a
maximumemission of 0.52 kg/109 J (1.2 Ib/10 O Btu), or 70%SO2 control, with
a maximumemission of 0.26 kg/109 J (0.6 ib/lO 6 Btu). The proposed particu-
late standard would limit emissions to 0.013 kg/lO 9 J (0.03 ib/106 Btu) and
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would require 99% reduction for solid fuels. EPA would also llmit NO x emis-
sions to 0.26 k_/lO 9 J (0.6 ib/106 Btu) for bituminous coal and to 0.22 kg/
109 J (0.5 ib/lO ° Btu) for gaseous fuel derived from coal.
SEVERITY RATING: 1
UNCERTAINTY RATING: i
REFERENCES: 24, 36-38
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TECHNOLOGY:Combined-Cycle Coal, Low-Btu Gaslfier, Open--CycleGas Turbine
ISSUENO. 7
PROCESS:Coal extraction and processing, plant operation.
IMPACTCATEGORY: Public health: water pollutant effluents, solid waste
leachates; continuous during plant operations.
PROBLEMSOURCE: Effluents to public waterways and ground water result from
coal mine drainage and seepage; runoff and leachates from coal storage piles,
refuse piles, and surface-mine reclamation lands; blowdown from cooling towers
and boilers; and discharge from metal cleaning, coal preparation, ash han-
dling, and low-Btu gasification processes. 39
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: The effluents potentially contain a large number
of chemical constituents, which, when contained in domestic water supplies,
could cause effects ranging from unpleasant odor and taste to toxic and
carcinogenic effects. Of particular concern are chemical constituents of
water in the coal gasifier, which are known to include carcinogens. 30-32
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: A recent study of the water quality impacts for
22 pollutants from greatly increased coal use projected potential new surface-
water quality standard violations or exacerbation of existing violations in
manyU.S. regions. 39 However, the projected increases in concentration due to
coal use were small compared to existing concentrations. Technologies exist to
control most pollutants at low levels, although control cost is an important
factor.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: Dose-response information for estimating
effects of low-level increases in water pollutants is generally not available.
Estimates of effects from groundwater contamination are not available either.
REGULATORYSTATUS: Water pollutants are controlled under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, the Clean Drinking Water Act, the Toxic Substances
Control Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (solid waste
disposal control). However, only a limited number of pollutants and tech-
nologies are currently regulated under these acts. In particular, federal
guidelines for coal-gasificatlon facilities and coal ash disposal have not
been established.
SEVERITYRATING: B
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 3
REFERENCES:30-32, 39
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TECHNOLOGY:
ISSUENO. 8
PROCESS:Generatlng-plant operation.
IMPACTCATEGORY: Public health:
during plant operation.
Comblned-Cycle Coal, Low-Btu Gaslfler, Open-Cycle Gas Turbine
radioactive coal emissions continuous
PROBLEM SOURCE: Small quantities of 238U, 235U, 232Th, and their radioactive
daughter products occur naturally in coal. Average concentrations from
various U.S. co_Is (799 samples) are 1.8 ppm for uranium and 4.7 ppm for
thorium. Maximum measured values are 43 ppm for uranium and 48 ppm for
thorium. The major portion of the radioactive products appears as a component
of the ash during coal combustion or gasification and is either discharged
through the stack or retained in the solid waste. Radioactive products may
also be found in process water effluent from the gasifier.
HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACT: Radionuclide exposure of humans occurs through
inhalation of airborne particles, exposure from particles deposited on ground
surfaces, water contamination from surface runoff of deposited atmospheric
particles, leaching of solid wastes and radioactive plant effluents, and from
ground deposits assimilated into the food chain. Radiation exposures may
induce cancer deaths or genetic defects; however, the level of impact from the
low levels anticipated from this source remain controversial. Principally at
issue is the validity of extrapolation of known dose-response relations from
higher levels of individual exposure.
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ESTIMATE: Assuming i ppm uranium and 2 ppm thorium in the
coal, 10% ash content, 0.5% emitted through a 300-m stack, and 0.38 kg coal/
kWh, the population dose commitments within 88.5 km for a midwestern site
from airborne releases at 1,000 MWe are estimated to be (rem/yr): whole
body 1.4, bone 12.9, lung 1.4, thyroid 1.4, kidneys 2.4, liver 1.7, spleen
1.9. Assuming dose-response values given in ref. 47, the above levels of
whole-body irradiation would imply 0.0023 excess cancer death per year and
0.002 genetic defect per year in the surrounding population. An ash emission
rate of 0.5% is conservative since the fuel gas is expected to be free of any
part_uu_=_=1-+__ma_o_._......offer its passage through the gas-cleanup system. Esti-
mates of exposure from solid and aqueous effluents are not available.
}_JOR UNCERTAINTIES REQUIRING R&D: Effects of low-level radiation; leachate
rate and fate of radioactive solid-waste constituents.
REGULATORY STATUS: No regulations for coal-fired plants. For comparison,
NRC regulations are that no member of the public shall receive a radiation
dose from light water nuclear reactors larger than 5 rem/yr to the whole
body or 15 rem/yr to the thyroid.
SEVERITY RATING: 3
UNCERTAINTY RATING: 2
REFERENCES: 14, 40, 41
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TECHNOLOGY:
ISSUE NO. 9
PROCESS:
components.
Combined-Cycle Coal, Low-Btu Gasifier, Open-Cycle Gas Turbine
Material extraction, processing, and fabrication for process
IMPACT CATEGORY: Occupational health and safety: mining and industrial
accidents and illness. Public health; industrial air emissions. Short-term--
prior to and during plant construction.
PROBLEM SOURCE: Significant quantitites of concrete, steel, and other metals
and metal products are required for coal mining, transport, and processing
and for plant construction.
HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACT: Mining of raw materials (e.g., iron ore, coal
used in steel manufacture), steel production, and component fabrication
involve public and occupational health and safety risks from manufacturing
emissions and transportation of products.
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ESTIMATE: Ref. 42 estimates the combined-cycle coal
resource requirement as 69.7 x 103 kg of steel/MW capacity and 67.4 x 103 kg
of concrete/MW capacity, which includes steel and concrete requirements for
the entire fuel cycle. Associated with this material acquisition, the esti-
mated occupational health and safety effects are: 0.53 death per I,O00-MW
plant, or 0.017 death per year averaged over a 30-year plant lifetime; 135 PDL
per I,O00-MW plant due to illness, or 4.5 PDL per year averaged over a 30-year
plant lifetime; and 4,275 PDL per 1,000-MW plant due to accidents, or 142 PDL
per year averaged over a 30-year plant lifetime.
MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES REQUIRING R&D: Estimates of component needs and of risk
from component fabrication for gasification facilities have limited historical
basis. Public risks from these activities are not included in the impact
estimates above.
REGULATORY STATUS: Occupational health and safety regulations have been
set for most conventional processes by OSHA and MESA. Regulations to control
public exposure to emissions from conventional processes are promulgated
by the EPA and related state organizations.
SEVERITY RATING: 2
UNCERTAINTY RATING: 2
REFERENCE: 42
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TECHNOLOGY:Combined-Cycle Coal, Low-Btu Gasifier, Open-Cycle Gas Turbine
_SSUENO. i0
PROCESS:Power plant operation.
IMPACTCATEGORY: Public health: atmospheric emissions (long-range, non-
radioactive), continuous during plant operation.
PROBLEMSOURCE:Atmospheric emission of residuals from the gasification and
combustion of coal is discussed in Issue 6. This issue deals with the effect
of those emissions on populations outside of the 80-km radius considered in
Issue 6. Various studies have shown that wind patterns can transport air
pollutants over hundreds of kilometers.43, 44 Furthermore, during the long
periods of transport, much of the SO 2 is oxidized to sulfates and forms
respirable particles 1-2 microns in diameter. These particles are considered
to be more hazardous than SO 2 in the gaseous phase.
HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACT: Health effects of air pollutants are discussed
in Issue 6.
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ESTIMATE: Due to the long-range transport, large popula-
tions may be exposed to low levels of pollutants from a single power plant.
For example, a 1,000-MW combined-cycle coal facility with emissions of the
reference design located along the Ohio river in southern Ohio is estimated to
cause a sulfate exposure of 0.01 pg/cm 3 in the densely populated New York City
area. Due to the uncertainty of the pollutant concentration estimates and the
effects of low-level exposure, a severity rating of (A) is specified for this
issue.
_JOR UNCERTAINTIES REQUIRING R&D: Characteristics and dose response for
specific pollutants emitted from combined-cycle plant; atmospheric transforma-
tion and long-range transport; effect of low-level exposures.
REGULATORY STATUS: See Issue 6.
SEVERITY RATING: A
UNCERTAINTY RATING: 3
REFERENCES: 43, 44
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TECHNOLOGY:Combined-Cycle Coal, Low-Btu Gasifier, Open-Cycle Gas Turbine
ISSUES NO. ii - 14
PROCESS: Coal transport (ii), Coal processing (12), Plant operation and
maintenance (13), Plant deactivation (14).
IMPACT CATEGORY: Occupational safety: accident risk continuous during
plant operation.
PROBLEM SOURCE: These issues include all of the various occupational safety
hazards typical of the processes required for the combined cycle technology,
with the exception of mining hazards, which are included in Issue 2.
HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACT: Accidents
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ESTIMATE: Plant deactivation (14): No estimates avail-
able: assumed comparable to construction (.036 death/yr/l,000 MW). Coal
processing (12): 24 0.076 death and 4.7 disabling injuries/yr (3.63 x 106
tons). Plant operation and maintenance (13): 44 0.I death and 4.3 disabling
injuries/yr. Coal transport (ii): 0.024 death and 9.2 disabling injuries/
i00 workers/yr (1975 statistics for all transportation and public util-
ities). 8
MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES REQUIRING R&D: Lack of experience with comblned-cycle
generation facilities.
REGULATORY STATUS:
SEVERITY RATING:
UNCERTAINTY RATING:
OSHA safety standards.
Ii: 2
12: 2
13: 1
14: 2
ii:
12:
13:
14:
REFERENCES: 8, 24, 44
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APPENDIX C
CENTRAL TERRESTRIAL PHOTOVOLTAIC SYSTEM:
ISSUE IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION
77
TECHNOLOGY:Central Photovoltaic Power System
ISSUENO. i
PROCESS: Raw-material extraction and processing for photovoltaic cells.
IMPACTCATEGORY:Occupational health and safety.
PROBLEMSOURCE: Workers involved in extracting and refining silicon and
doping agents for photovoltaic cells are exposed to hazardous materials and
potential accident situations. Quartzite and sandstone extraction and silicon
refining expose workers to large quantities of silicon dust, as well as to a
high risk of accidents. Cd is recovered during Zn refining, Ga is a by-
product of A1 extraction from bauxite, and As is produced during Cu and Pb
smelting. Workers involved in extraction and processing techniques that
produce doping agents are at high risk of both accidents and exposure to
refining acids and metal fumes.
HEALTHAND SAFETYIMPACT: Chronic exposure to silicon dust may result in
silicosis, a disease which impairs respiratory function and predisposes
victims to other respiratory diseases. Toxic impacts of exposure to Cd, Ga,
As, and Pb include irreversible cardiovascular, renal, and neurological
damage. Exposure to acids and their vapors used in metal refining can result
in chemical burns and respiratory dysfunction.
QUANTITATIVE_PACT ESTIMATE: No quantitative estimates are currently avail-
able; however, the relative risks of industries extracting and processing
materials needed for photovoltaic cell production are amongthe highest of all
U.S. industries:
Industry
Person Days Lost/
100 Full-Time Workersa
U.S. -- All Industries
Lead and Zinc Mining
Nonferrous Primary Smelting
Nonferrous Secondary Smelting
Quartzite Mining
59
180
120
117
130
aAverage values for accidents and injuries, 1975-1979.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: The impact of increased production of
photovoltaic materials on worker productivity and extraction and refining
technology. Such changes could significantly affect occupational exposures to
metals and increase the risk of accidents.
Material requirements for commercial-level production of photovoltaic cells
have not been determined.
REGULATORYSTATUS: OSHAstandards regulate exposure of occupational popula-
tions to most gases, dusts, fumes, and vapors released during production of
photovoltalc materials and also establish safety procedures to control
accidents.
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SEVERITYRATING: A
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 3
REFERENCES:8, 29, 42, 45, 46
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TECHNOLOGY:Central Photovoltaic PowerSystem
ISSUENO. IA
PROCESS: Raw-material extraction and processing for photovoltaic cells
IMPACTCATEGORY:Public health.
PROBLEMSOURCE:Production of raw materials for photovoltaic cells results in
a release of atmospheric, aquatic, and solid waste products with potential
adverse humanhealth impacts. Specific releases vary with type of cell being
produced. All cells currently considered for use consist primarily of silicon
with p- and n-type dopants. Refining of silicon requires combustion of large
amounts of coke with corresponding environmental releases of particulates and
SOx. Proposed dopants include phosphorus/boron, cadmiumsulfide, and gallium
aluminum arsenide. Production of Si and dopants releases significant quanti-
ties of cadmium, gallium, and silicon dust to the atmosphere and increases the
potential for an aquatic discharge of cadmiumand arsenic and other produc-
tion-related trace metals such as copper, lead, selenium, and zinc.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: Chronic exposure to silicon dust results in sili-
cosis, a degenerative respiratory disease. Exposure to excess levels of trace
metals results in a variety of physiological disorders ranging from emphysema
to renal dysfunction to cancer. Many trace elements exhibit tendencies to
accumulate through food chains, thus increasing the toxic potential at each
trophic level.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: Quantitative estimates of public health impacts
from environmental releases of photovoltaic cell material during extraction
and refining are not well established. Potentially significant releases
include:
Atmospheric emissions: particulates, SOx, NOx, and HC
Aquatic effluents: Nil3 phenols, As, TSS, Cd, Cu, Pb, Se,
Zn, and oil
Solid wastes: CdO, ZnS04, Si0, and AI203
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: Impact of increased demand for photo-
voltaic cells on raw material extraction, refining and production techniques,
and subsequent environmental emissions.
Humanhealth effects and dose-response relationships of effluents from appli-
cable raw material and refining technologies.
REGULATORYSTATUS: Environmental releases of silicon dust, arsenic, and
cadmium are controlled under Effluent Limitation Guidelines and New Source
Performance Standards for quartzite, zinc, lead, copper and aluminum extrac-
tion and smelting industries.
SEVERITYRATING: A
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 3
REFERENCES:8, 29, 42, 45-47
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TECHNOLOGY:Central Photovoltaic Power System
ISSUENO. IB
PROCESS:Production of p_otovoltaic cells.
IMPACTCATEGORY:Occupational health.
PROBLEMSOURCE:Production of silicon photovoltaic cells will expose workers
to silicon dust, process chemicals, and doping agents including phosphine and
boron trichloride. Proposed Cd/S and GaAIAscell concepts have not progressed
beyond bench-scale production techniques• Commercial-scale production may
alter exposure significantly, but potential exists for worker exposure to
silicon dust, SnOx, HFNO3,Cd/S, and GaAIAs, as well as acids and degreaslng
solvents.
HEALTH AND SAFETY _IPACT: Silicosis, a degenerative respiratory disease, is a
well-documented effect of silicon dust inhalation. Exposure to cadmium fumes
and dusts is known to cause pulmonary edema, emphysema, and hypertension.
GaA1As is a potential carcinogen. Other chemicals related to photovoltaic cell
production may be equally toxic.
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ESTIMATE: No quantitative impact estimates currently
exist. Risk from exposure to materials used in photovoltaic cell production
has been recognized, and occupational standards have been set for several
production materials including silicon dust, phosgene, arsenic, and cadmium.
Exposures may be kept to a minimum through design engineering and use of
protective equipment.
MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES REQUIRING R&D: Commercial-scale production techniques
and resulting worker exposure to toxic substances.
REGULATORY STATUS: OSHA standards have been set for many chemicals and
materials of potential use in photovoltaic cell production.
SEVERITY RATING: B
UNCERTAINTY RATING: 3
REFERENCES: 45, 47
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TECHNOLOGY: Central Photovoltaic Power System
ISSUE NO. IC
PROCESS: Production of photovoltaic cells.
IMPACT CATEGORY: Public health.
PROBLEM SOURCE: Production of photovoltaic cells involves toxic substances
including silicon dust, Sn0x, HFN03, Cd, As, and Ga.
HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACT: Release of toxic substances to the environment via
atmospheric emissions, aquatic effluents, and solid waste during photovoltaic
cell production poses threats to public health through direct exposure (in-
halation, water ingestion). Some toxic photovoltaic substances (e.g., As, Cd)
accumulate through food chains, thus increasing indirect exposure and poten-
tial adverse health impacts.
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ESTIMATE: No quantitative estimates of the impact currently
exist.
MAJOR UNCERTAINTY REQUIRING R&D: Potential for environmental release of
toxic substances from photovoltaic cell production.
REGULATORY STATUS: No effluent standards currently exist for the photovoltaic
industry.
SEVERITY RATING: B
UNCERTAINTY RATING: 3
REFERENCES: 45, 47
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TECHNOLOGY:Central Photovoltaic Power System
ISSUENO. 2
PROCESS: Extraction, material processing, fabrication, transportation of
conventional products.
IMPACTCATEGORY:Occupational and public health and safety.
PROBLEMSOURCE: Substantial amounts of conventional materials, e.g., alu-
mlnum, glass, steel, and cement, are required by central photovoltaic power
systems. Fulfilling these requirements involves extraction, refining, fabri-
cation, and transportation of raw and finished goods as well as the use of
large amounts of electricity. Each of these activities is associated with
public health risk resulting from air, water, and solid waste residuals and
transportation accidents and with occupational health risk from workplace
exposure to toxic substances and accidents.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: Production of conventional materials for use in
photovoltaic central power systems will require slgnlflcant numbersof workers
in high-rlsk occupations such as mineral mining and primary and secondary
metal production. Environmental release of air, water, and solid waste resid-
uals from these conventional processes will increase public health risk.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: There are significant variations in estimates
of both occupational and public health impacts. A composite of projections
appears below:
Material Aqulsitlon a Transportation
Type of Occupational Public Occupational Public
Impact Health Health Health Health
Deaths b 0.061-0.467
Person Days Lost a
lllness 60-111
Injury 1,400-3,810
0.0275
20-140
3.2 0.7
2,900 i. 5
alncludes extraction, processing, and fabrication.
bper 1,000-MW output.
MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES REQUIRING R&D: Conventional material and manpower
requirements for photovoltalc central power systems.
REGULATORY STATUS: Most industries and processes contributing materials to
photovoltalc central power systems will be regulated by one or more of the
following: NSPS, OSHA, RECRA, TOSCA, CAA, and WPCA.
SEVERITY RATING: 1
UNCERTAINTY RATING: 2
REFERENCES: 42, 46
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TECHNOLOGY:Central Photovoltaic Power System
ISSUENO. 3
PROCESS:Construction of central system.
IMPACTCATEGORY:Occupational health and safety.
PROBLEMSOURCE: Construction of central photovoltaic power systems requires
large amounts of manpower. Estimates vary significantly, ranging from 80,800
to 33,700,000 person hours/l,000 MW. Primary trades involved in construction
include cement, electrical, roofing, sheet metal, and miscellaneous contrac-
ting.
HEALTHAND SAFETYIMPACT: Construction activities involve worker exposure
to potential accident situations and toxic chemicals. Nature of risk varies
with the trade involved:
Industry
Sheet Metal
Electrical
Cement
Roofing
a1975-77 average
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE:
Person Days Lost/
100 Full-Time Employeesa
106
122
127
90
Quantitative estimates of health impacts vary
as radically as do estimates of manpowerneeds:
Type of
Impact
Deaths
Person Days Lostc
Illness
Accident
aSource: Ref. 42.
bSource: Ref. 46.
Cper l,O00-MW/year output.
Impact
Estimates
0.037a-7.91 b
4.0a-350b
310a-24,600b
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: Refinement of manpower requirements
during construction phase of photovoltaic central power plant. Characteriza-
tion of hazardous material exposures of construction personnel.
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REGULATORYSTATUS:
tion site operation.
SEVERITYRATING: i
UNCERTAINTYRATING:
REFERENCES:42, 46
OSHAhealth and safety regulations will apply to construc-
2
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TECHNOLOGY:Central Photovoltaic Power System
ISSUE NO. 4
PROCESS: Operation and maintenance of central photovoltaic power systems.
IMPACT CATEGORY: Occupational health and safety.
PROBLEM SOURCE: Daily operation and upkeep procedures, e.g., cleaning cell
lenses, maintaining transformers and transmission lines, and repairing peri-
odic system malfunctions (such as, array overheating) will result in health
and safety risk to occupational personnel.
HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACT: Major sources of health and safety impacts include
physical trauma resulting from accidents occurring during routine operation
and maintenance procedures and exposure to gases during episodes of array
overheating and release of toxic doping agents (e.g., As, Cd, and Ga).
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ESTIMATE: Quantitative impacts are tentative pending
characterization of occupational conditions. The range of current estimates
is shown below:
Type of
Impact
Deaths a
Person Days Lost a
Illness
Injury
aper 1,000-MW/year output.
bSource: Ref. 42.
CSource: Ref. 46.
Impact
Estimates
0b-l. 22 c
oh-0.16 c
0b-3,800 c
MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES REQUIRING R&D: Manpower needs of operation and main-
tenance activities, potential for system malfunction.
REGULATORY STATUS: Exposure to toxic gases will be regulated by OSHA.
SEVERITY RATING: i
UNCERTAINTY RATING: 2
REFERENCES: ii, 42, 45
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TECHNOLOGY:Central Photovoltaic Power System
ISSUENO. 5
PROCESS:Disposal recycling of spent photovoltaic cells.
IMPACTCATEGORY:Occupational and public health.
PROBLEMSOURCE: Photovoltaic central power stations are projected to have
30-year lifetimes. Photovoltaic cells are projected to have much shorter
lifetimes: i0 years for silicon and GaAIAs cells, 5 years for Cd/S cells.
1,000 MWof GaAIAs cells will contain approximately 1.27 x 107 kg of GaAIAs
polycrystal. 1,000 MWof Cd/S cells will contain approximately 9.8 x 105 kg
of Cd/S. As a result, large amounts of potentially toxic Ga, As, and Cd will
need to be recycled or disposed of during the lifetime of a power station.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: Disposal or recycling of photovoltaic cells could
pose Ga, As, and Cd exposure threats to workers dealing with spent cells
via direct contact and inhalation of gas or particulates and to the public
via leaching from disposal sites and subsequent bioaccumulation.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: No quantitative impact estimates are currently
available.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: Procedures and technologies for reuse
or disposal of spent photovoltaic cells.
REGULATORYSTATUS: RECRAregulations requiring "cradle to grave" maintenance
of toxic substances will apply to toxic substances in photovoltalc cells.
SEVERITYRATING: A
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 3
REFERENCES:45, 47
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TECHNOLOGY:Satellite Power System
ISSUENO. i
PROCESS: Extraction, material processing, fabrication and construction,
and transportation.
IMPACTCATEGORY:Occupational and public health.
PROBLEMSOURCE: Significant quantities of conventional products (e.g.,
cement, steel, aluminum, copper, glass, and ceramics) will be required.
Conventional assembly techniques are assumed. The incremental public and
occupational health impacts of these requirements will be nonnegligible.
HEALTHAND SAFETYIMPACT: Acquisition of materials and components will
require significant numbersof workers in high-risk activities such as primary
metal production, mineral mining, and concrete production, with resultant
incidents of injury and illness.
There is a potential for public health impacts from toxic air emissions, water
effluents, and solid wastes generated during production of materials and
components and transportation of raw materials and finished goods to launch
and rectenna sites.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: Occupational injuries due to material acquisi-
tion, ground construction, and ground operation: _1.854 person-days lost/DfW
yr, _0.0003 fatality/MW yr. 49
Occupational illness due to material acquisition, ground construction, and
ground operation: 0.605 PDL/MWyr,* _0.00001 fatality/MW yr. 49
Health impact incidence rate of 57 PDL/IO0 manyr is 7%higher than national
average (1975) for all industries. These impacts represent 98% of total
manpowerinvolved in SPSactivity.
Public health impacts have not been quantified.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: System component needs and material
requirements need better definition.
Changes in conventional processes, technologies, and emission controls may
result from SPSdemands.
REGULATORYSTATUS: Occupational health and safety regulations have been set
for most conventional processes by the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA)and the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA). Regula-
tions to control public exposure to potentially dangerous emissions from
conventional processes are promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and related state organizations.
SEVERITYRATING: 1
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 2
REFERENCES:29, 42, 48-50
* Assumes450-GWSPSsystem with 30-yr life, 0.92 load factor (1.325 x l07 MW
yr).
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TECHNOLOGY:Satellite Power System
ISSUENO. 2
PROCESS: Material processing/fabrication; photovoltaic cell production.
IMPACTCATEGORY:Occupational health and public health.
PROBL_ISOURCE: Production of silicon and gallium aluminum arsenide photo-
voltaic cells will result in potentially dangerous public and occupational
exposure to silica dust, arsenic, gallium, sulfur oxides, and methacrylate
doping agents.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: Atmospheric emissions of GaAIAs, arsenlc-bearing
particulates, and SO2 may be a national pollution problem if GaAIAs cells
are produced on a level needed for SPS use. Silicon production and cell
fabrication will increase worker exposure to silicon, increasing the risk of
silicosis, and to toxic doping agents, resulting in respiratory and carcin-
ogenic effects.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: It is estimated that approximately 156 kg
of particulates and 459 kg of S0x will be emitted during production of silicon
for one MWof photovoltaic cells. 45 Sufficient data are not available for
quantification of other emissions from GaAIAscell production. Occupational
exposure to toxic substances such as silicon dust may reach dangerous levels.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: Effectiveness of occupational exposure
control measures during GaAIAs cell production. Impact of public health of
emissions related to production of photovoltaic cells.
REGULATORYSTATUS: OSHAregulations exist for toxic substances such as
arsenic, cadmium, and silicon.
SEVERITYRATING: A
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 3
REFERENCES:45, 47, 48
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TECHNOLOGY:Satellite Power System
ISSUENO. 3
PROCESS:Transportation: material and personnel transfer from launch site to
low earth orbit (LEO).
IMPACTCATEGORY: Public health, catastrophic event potential, continuous
risk during facility construction and operation.
PROBLEM SOURCE: Malfunctions of propellant and navigational systems pose
potential public health risks from explosion of fuels (liquid 02, H2, NH4,
hydrazine) during launch and from crash and/or explosion during flight and
reentry of cargo and personnel vehicles.
HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACT: Explosions and inflight system malfunctions pose
risk of thermal and other physical trauma to populations located in flight
pattern or near launch site.
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ESTIMATE: Flash from explosion of heavy-lift launch
vehicle (HLLV) fully fueled with liquid hydrogen is projected to cause first-
degree burns at 300 m distance from explosion. Estimate of maximum deaths
resulting from HLLV crash-and-burn scenario may exceed 1,000. Although
approximately 400 HLLV flights, 30 personnel launch vehicle (PVL) flights, 30
cargo orbital transfer vehicle (COTV) flights, and 25 personnel orbital
transfer vehicle (POTV) flights will be required per 5 GW of SPS capacity,
current reference design projections include a zero probability for launch
failure.
}L_JOR UNCERTAINTIES REQUIRING R&D: Frequency potential for propellent and
navigational system failure.
REGULATORY STATUS: No regulations currently applicable
SEVERITY RATING: A
UNCERTAINTY RATING: 3
REFERENCES: 48, 50-53
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TECHNOLOGY:Satellite Power System
ISSUENO. 4
PROCESS:Transportation: material and personnel transfer between launch site
and low earth orbit (LEO).
IMPACTCATEGORY: Public health: Noise exposure, atmospheric emission
effects during facility construction and facility operation and maintenance.
PROBLEMSOURCE:Potential that HLLVwill exceed EPAnoise-level guidelines.
Creation of sonic boomsfrom launch and reentry of HLLV.
Potentially harmful concentrations and dispersions of toxic emissions from
HLLVground cloud.
Potential upper-atmosphere changes resulting from column-cloud emissions
from HLLV.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: Noise impacts at both ascent and reentry may
cause annoyanceand nonprimary structural damageand mayexceed ambient noise
standards.
There is a potential for general population exposure to toxic levels of
fuel emissions such as AI, hydrazine, NO2, and CO from cargo and personnel
transport vehicles.
Fuel exhaust may cause changes in the ionosphere and stratosphere such as
ozone depletion leading to weather modification and increased radiation expo-
sure and resulting health impacts. 51
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: 95 dBa sound pressure level (SPL) at 6 km
from launch of HLLV, 65 dBa at 24 hour time-weighted concentration.
Overpressure level of sonic boomsfrom ascent and reentry may cause nonprimary
structural damageat distance of up to 185 km.
Emission concentrations in the ground cloud have not been quantified (would
depend on fuel type and HLLVcharacteristics).
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: Dispersion patterns and concentrations of
toxic materials in launch ground cloud, impact of HLLV emissions on upper
atmosphere.
REGULATORYSTATUS: 70 dBa EPA day guideline, 50 dBa EPA night guideline;
Committee on Toxicology has set recommendations for exposure to rocket pro-
pellant emissions.
SEVERITYRATING: A
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 3
REFERENCES:49, 50-52, 54
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TECHNOLOGY:Satellite Power System
ISSUENO. 5
PROCESS: Transportation: material and personnel transfer from launch site
to low earth orbit (LEO) and from LEO to geosychronos earth orbit (GEO).
IMPACTCATEGORY:Occupational, noise exposure, safety risks during facility
construction and facility operation and maintenance.
PROBL_ SOURCE: There is a potential for exceeding OSHAnoise guidelines
during HLLV launch at launch site and for exposure to toxic components of
fuels during spill episode and during launch.
There is a potential for explosion from fuel spillage and/or system malfunc-
tion at launch site.
There is a potential for system malfunction in transit.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: Conventional launch poses potential risk to workers
from noise exposure and vehicle emissions. Explosion or fuel system malfunc-
tion creates a potential for physical, thermal, noise, and toxic-chemical
exposure for terrestrial and space workers.
Malfunction of guidance and/or life-support systems in space poses physical
risks to space workers.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: HLLV spill/explosion episode would involve
850,000 gal of liquid hydrogen, with ignition of combustibles and first-degree
burns at 300 m.
No quantification of in-transit system malfunction is currently available.
Sound pressure levels in launch area will exceed pain threshold (130 dB)
during conventional launch.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: Identification of toxic exposure potential
from used and unused fuels. Probability of malfunction of propellant, naviga-
tion, and life-support systems.
REGULATORYSTATUS: Recommendedexposure limits _..... _ p_p_11_nr_ bv
Committee on Toxicology and noise-exposure-limits regulation by OSHA.
SEVERITYRATING: B
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 3
REFERENCES:49, 51, 53, 55
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TECHNOLOGY:Satellite Power System
ISSUENO. 6
PROCESS: Construction: photovoltalc array, microwave transmission system
in GEOand LEO.
IMPACTCATEGORY:Occupational health and safety.
PROBLEMSOURCE: Absence of a llfe-supportlng environment in space requires
provisions for such needs as air, water, food, and shelter -- all subject to
system failure.
High-energy heavy ions (HZE), electron-bremsstrahlung, excess ultraviolet
radiation, and meteors are potential threats to personnel in space.
Limited social and recreational outlets, awareness of space-associated
hazards, and weightlessness may affect the physiological and psychological
health of workers.
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ESTIMATE: No quantitative estimates are currently avail-
able. However, during the construction phase approximately 960 workers [740
in (low earth orbit) LEO, 200 in (geosynchronous earth orbit) GEO] will be
required per i0 GW of capacity. Current plans call for a 90-day maximum for
workers to stay in space and a similar time period required for construction
of each GEO satellite (see also Issue 7). Total elapsed time from implemen-
tation of material transport to LEO base construction to completion of GEO
transmitting antenna is estimated to be 24 months per 5-GW station.
MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES REQUIRING R&D: Long-term impacts of exposure to radiation
hazards in space, psychological reaction of contructlon personnel to confines
of life in space
REGULATORY STATUS:
SEVERITY RATING: B
UNCERTAINTY RATING: 3
No regulations currently applicable.
REFERENCES: 48, 49, 51
95
TECHNOLOGY:Satellite Power System
ISSUENO. 7
PROCESS:Operation and maintenance: Space photovoltaic array, and microwave
power transmission system in GEOand LEO.
IMPACTCATEGORY:Occupational Health: Electromagnetic radiation exposure,
safety considerations.
PROBLEMSOURCE: Diffraction and reflection of microwaves from transmission
array and/or from leakage (e.g., structural failure, cracked waveguldes)
mayexpose workers to potentially dangerous levels of microwaves.
Physiological and mental stresses of llfe in space resulting from exposure
to cosmic radiation (e.g., protons, alpha particles, HZE, and confinement of
life-support quarters pose potential health risks to workers (see also
Issue 6).
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: Short-term exposure to excess microwave radiation
may result in excess thermal stress as well as dysfunction of the central
nervous system. The impact of exposure to low-level microwaves is uncertain
but of potential significance. The impact of weightlessness (e.g., reduction
of red cell mass, immunologic system changes, plasma volume decrease, loss of
calcium from bones, and occurrence or threat of failure of llfe-support
systems) increases psychological stress of workers in space (see also
Issue 6).
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: Accidental microwave exposure could approach
a power density of 2,500 mW/cm2. Although no quantitative estimate of the
incidence of accidental exposure is available, the number of operation and
maintenance personnel at risk will be approximately 13 (7 in LEO, 6 in GEO)
per satellite. Maximumstay in space will be 90 days.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: Effects of long-term low-level microwave
exposure. Effects of exposure to space radiation hazards.
REGULATORYSTATUS: OSHAstandard for microwaves is i0 mW/cm2 per 8-hr with
no excursions > 25 WW/cm 2.
SEVERITY RATING: B
UNCERTAINTY RATING: 3
REFERENCES: 49, 51, 56
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TECHNOLOGY:Satellite Power System
ISSUENO. 8
PROCESS:Operation and maintenance.
_IPACTCATEGORY:Public health-electromagnetlc radiation.
PROBLEMSOURCE: Exposure of the public to electromagnetic radiation from
low-level microwave exposure outside of rectenna exclusion zone.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: Populations close to rectennae may be subject to
low-level microwave exposure from grating lobes, reflection, and rectenna
anomalies and to electromagnetic fields created by power transmission.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: The effects of chronic exposure to low-level
microwaves (< i mW/cm2) at the operating frequency of 2.45 MHzare uncertain.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: Health effects of exposure to low-level
microwaves. Siting patterns that may create nodes in grating lobe patterns
that exceed the reference system projection of 0.01 mW/cm2, maximum,outside
of rectenna exclusion zone.
REGULATORYSTATUS: No current regulations applicable.
SEVERITYRATING: A
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 3
REFERENCES:48, 49, 51
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TECHNOLOGY:Satellite Power System
ISSUENO. 9
PROCESS: Operation and maintenance; ground station rectenna, microwave
reception, power transmission.
IMPACTCATEGORY:Occupational health and safety.
PROBLE_SOURCE:There is potential risk to rectenna site workers from micro-
wave dispersion and reflection at rectenna site due to atmospheric diffraction
and rectenna anomalies and/or malfunctions, and from creatlon of a high-
intensity, low-frequency electromagnetic field during electric power transmis-
sion.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: Short-term exposure to excess amounts of low-level
microwave radiation may result in excess thermal stress (the retina of the eye
is especially susceptible to thermal damage)and changes in central nervous
system functions. The impact of exposure to hlgh-intensity, low-frequency
electromagnetic fields is not thoroughly understood.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: Accidental exposures (e.g., power beamreflec-
tlon) could result in worker exposures to power beamdensities of 23 mW/cm2.
Effect of long-term exposure to hlgh-intenslty, low-frequency electromagnetic
fields is uncertain. The effect of low-level, long-term microwave exposure to
levels < 1.0 mW/cm2 is uncertain.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: Effects of long-term exposure to low-level
microwaves and low-frequency electromagnetic radiation.
REGULATORYSTATUS: OSHAstandard for microwave exposure is i0 mW/cm2 per 8 hr
weighted average, no excursions above 25 mW/cm2.
SEVERITYRATING: B
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 3
REFERENCES:49, 51
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TECHNOLOGY:Satellite Power System
ISSUENO. I0
PROCESS:Operation and maintenance.
IMPACTCATEGORY:Public health and safety.
PROBLEMSOURCE:Excursion of power beam density beyond 23 mW/cm2 reference
system limit. Inadvertent or surreptitlons focusing of one or more beams
outside of rectenna exclusion zone. It has been pointed out, however,
that such redirection would be technically difficult according to the current
reference design in which the power beam could only be focused toward the
origin of a pilot beam.48 With this concept, the change in direction would
require that a large transmitting antenna and hlgh-power signal transmitter be
constructed at the precise location where the beamis to be focused. The new
transmitted pilot beamwould have to simulate the original beam's code con-
struction and transmit sufficient power to override the original signal.
Furthermore, simultaneous failure or overriding of the ground monitoring
system would be required to prevent detection of beammovement.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: Misdirection of power beamto center on populated
areas would have significant psychological and potential physiological impact.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: Limits on power beam densities (23 mW/cm2)
under the current reference system are based on theoretical atmospheric-
heating constraints. OSHAstandard (8-hr work day) is i0 mW/cm2 with no
excursions beyond 25 mW/cm2.56 Thermal effects in humansare noticeable at
_I00 mW/cm2. The surface area of the power beamis _80 km2.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: Reliability of system for directing and
shutting downthe beam, susceptibility of directional controls to redirection,
theoretical 23 mW/cm2 limit of power beam density. The reference system
design has not been fully tested and thus its operational charcterlstlcs are
unknown. If major problems should be encountered, requiring redesign, the
safety features could be affected. The combination of inherent safety in
current design, but uncertainty in final design warrants a (B) severity rating
for this issue.
REGULATORYSTATUS:
SEVERITY RATING: B
UNCERTAINTY RATING: 3
No regulations currently applicable.
REFERENCES: 48, 51, 56
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TECHNOLOGY: Fusion Power System
ISSUE NO. I
PROCESS: Lithium ore extraction and processing.
IMPACT CATEGORY: Accidental injury as a result of mine operations and ore
processing.
PROBL_ SOURCE: Accidental injury.
HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACT: Lithium extraction utilizes two techniques, open
pit mining and brine pumping operations. The lithium concentration in the
extracted product is in the range of 500 to 6,000 ppm; therefore ore proc-
essing is considered an integral part of the extraction process. These
operations can be assumed to be similar to other industrial operations that
utilize similar techniques such as uranium surface mine operations. As such,
they can be expected to exhibit a similar accidental injury magnitude based on
production levels.
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ESTIMATE: On the basis of an annual estimated requirement
of 3 x 105 kg of lithium for a power facility and an ore yield of 5%, assuming
injury rates similar to the uranium processing industry, an estimated 0.0018
fatal and 0.0068 nonfatal injuries can be attributed to the annual lithium
requirements of an operating I,O00-MWe fusion reactor.
MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES REQUIRING R&D: A more precise evaluation of the lithium
extraction industry is required.
REGULATORY STATUS: Federal mine safety regulations cover operations such
as those of surface mining.
SEVERITY: 3
UNCERTAINTY: 1
REFERENCES: 8, 57
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TECHNOLOGY: Fusion Power System
ISSUE NO. 2
PROCESS: Fabrication of structural components.
IMPACT CATEGORY: Occupational safety: general industrial safety.
PROBLEM SOURCE: Workplace accidents and injuries.
HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACT: Substantial industrial commitments will be required
to supply the building materials and operating systems for fusion facility
construction and maintenance. Accidents occurring in industries with a
recognized involvement with these fusion requirements, such as cement and
heavy machinery manufacturing, can then be attributed to the proven tech-
nology.
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ESTIMATE: General industrial accidental injury rates
are reasonable estimates for the injury experience of industries that would be
involved with fusion power. These rates predict 0.06 fatal and 0.32 nonfatal
injuries per 106 person hours. On the basis of these rates an estimated 0.001
fatality and 0.01 nonfatal injury can be attributed to annual operation of a
fusion facility.
MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES REQUIRING R&D: Industrial accident rates must be more
specific to the actual requirements of fusion energy.
REGULATORY STATUS: Workplace safety is regulated by OSHA industrial safety
standards.
SEVERITY RATING: 3
UNCERTAINTY RATING: I
REFERENCE: 8
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TECHNOLOGY:Fusion Power System
ISSUENO. 3
PROCESS:Componentfabrication.
I_ACT CATEGORY:Occupational health: toxic agent exposure; metal aerosols.
PROBLEMSOURCE: Exposure to beryllium oxides as airborne particulates.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: Fabrication of a fusion reactor will require large
quantities of refined metals for specific components. Onesuch metal, beryl-
lium, is known from industrial experience to be toxic and to be a cancer-
causing agent. Construction of the first wall of the reactor could conceiv-
ably result in worker exposure to beryllium aerosols.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: The impact of worker exposure to beryllium
during fabricat{on of a fusion reactor is not readily assessable. Since this
metal is a recognized toxic agent, good industrial hygiene should insure that
no worker contamination occurs. However, the potential for serious after-
effects should be recognized in the event of inadvertent exposure.
MAJORUNCERTAINTYREQUIRINGR&D: The actual workplace experience that would
be required to fabricate reactor componentsmust be defined so that a more
precise estimate of the potentSal of a beryllium hazard can be made.
REGULATORYSTATUS: OSHAworkplace standard for beryllium compounds: Thresh-
old Limit Value (TLV) 0.002 mg/m3.
SEVERITYRATING: A
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 3
REFERENCES:63, 64
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TECHNOLOGY:Fusion Power System
ISSUENO. 4
PROCESS:Fuel preparation and handling.
DIPACT CATEGORY: Occupational health: occupational exposure to tritium.
PROBLEM SOURCE: Low-level radiation exposure.
HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACT: A fusion reactor will require a charge of tritium
during initial start-up. After the start-up phase a continuous supply of
tritium will be generated through a lithium-breedlng reaction. The continuous
handling requirement for fuel processing will result in occupational exposures
to the radionuclide and present a potentially hazardous situation.
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ESTIMATE: It is not possible to estimate the health
impact of low-level workplace exposure to tritium at this time. Even though
the radiological hazard of this radionuclide is relatively small it must be
recognized as a possible source of radiation contamination.
_IAJOR UNCERTAINTY REQUIRING R&D: The extent of exposure likely to occur as
a result of tritium-handling activities.
REGULATORY STATUS:
SEVERITY RATING: B
UNCERTAINTY RATING:
REFERENCE: 65
Standard radiological protection procedures.
3
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TECHNOLOGY:Fusion Power System
ISSUENO. 5
PROCESS:Fuel preparation.
IMPACTCATEGORY:Occupational exposure to hydrogen sulfide.
PROBLD_ SOURCE: Toxic chemical exposure.
HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACT: Deuterium production by the girdler process re-
quires hydrogen sulfide (H2S) for deuterium separation. The toxic nature of
H2S is well documented. Good engineering practice and industrial hygiene will
ensure that during normal operations the separation plant work place is
protected from adverse H2S exposure. However, in scaling up such operations,
allowance must be made for mechanical failures resulting in very high exposure
levels.
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ESTIMATE: No impact estimates are available at this
time, but they can be conjectured to be similar to those for other industrial
operations requiring the use of toxic gases such as chlorine and hydrogen
cyanide.
MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES REQUIRING R&D: The nature of unintentional serious
exposures must be deferred to determine the seriousness of this hazard.
REGULATORY STATUS: OSHA workplace standard for worker exposure: TLV =
15 mg/m 3.
SEVERITY RATING: A
UNCERTAINTY RATING: 3
REFERENCE: 57
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TECHNOLOGY: Fusion Power System
ISSUE NO. 6
PROCESS: Normal plant operations.
PROBLEM SOURCE: Low-level radiation exposure.
HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACT: Refer to Issue 4. The primary concern is over
general population exposure to tritium.
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ESTIMATE: Maximum ground-level dose downwind of the
fusion plant: i rem/year.
MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES REQUIRING R&D: Further clarification of the dose term
is needed.
REGULATORY STATUS: l_ximum dose level allowed would be regulated by NRC
standards for exposure.
SEVERITY RATING: B
UNCERTAINTY RATING: 3
REFERENCE: 63
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TECHNOLOGY:Fusion Power System
ISSUENO. 7
PROCESS:Normal plant operations.
PROBLEMSOURCE: Occupational health: exposure to hlgh-strength magnetic
fields.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: A unique source of potentially adverse exposure
for the plant work force is the high magnetic field associated with the
plasma-containment requirement of the Tokamakdesign. The possibility exists
for physiological reactions to such exposures.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: No quantitative estimate of the impact of high
magnetic fields can be madeat this tlme.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: The biological effects of magnetic fields
are being studied. No information relating to fusion power is available.
REGULATORYSTATUS:
SEVERITYRATING: B
UNCERTAINTYRATING:
REFERENCES:59, 60
Noneavailable.
3
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TECHNOLOGY:Fusion Power System
ISSUENO. 8
PROCESS:Waste disposal, damagerepair.
PROBLEMSOURCE: Health of general population: exposure to activation
products.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: The severe environment of the interior of a fusion
reactor results from the high temperatures and intense neutron flux required
for operation. Materials subjected to such harsh conditions undergo degrada-
tion and require continuous replacement. Neutron bombardmentwill result in
high levels of induced radiation in the components, requiring replacement, and
will pose a significant radiation hazard to plant workers. Once replaced, the
activated componentsmust be disposed of in a fashion that will ensure that no
residual radiological hazard exists. An average value of 180 + kg per year
is estimated as the mass of neutron-actlvated reactor waste that must be
disposed of for a single 1,000-MWefusion facility.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: It is not possible to assess the impact of
fusion-activated waste. However, since the wastes are expected to be mate-
rials of a solid, nonvolatile nature, the radiological hazard for such waste
products are anticipated to be less than those for nonfuel products of
fission.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: More precise estimates of the radiological
hazard will not be possible until an actual fusion design is evaluated.
Only then will reasonable population-dose/commitment calculation be possible.
REGULATORYSTATUS: NRCstandards cover the handling and disposal of radio-
active waste; the products of a fusion facility are not anticipated to require
any unique regulatory action.
SEVERITYRATING: B
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 3
REFERENCE:62
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TECHNOLOGY:Fusion Power System
ISSUENO. 9
PROCESS:Transportation of materials, fuels, and waste.
PROBL_SOURCE:General safety: highway accident injury.
HEALTHAND SAFETYIMPACT: The fusion fuel cycle will be more closed than
that for fission. The principal requirement will be for continuous replace-
ment of lithium at roughly 130 + kg per 1,000 MWe. Since the lithium is
nonradioactive, shielding would not be an issue for transportation; however,
the cargo must be protected from exposure to air and water to keep the possi-
bility of fire or explosion to a minimum.
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ESTIMATE: An estimate of the possible impact to public
safety can be made by assuming an accident impact for lithium transport
similar to that for bulk fuels. Using such an approach the level of impact
estimated would be on the order of 1.28 x 10 -4 fatal and i.i x 10 -3 nonfatal
accidental injuries per 1,000 MWe/year.
MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES REQUIRING R&D: A more precise estimate is possible with
further clarification of the actual yearly operating requirements for the
fusion plant.
REGULATORY STATUS: The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulates inter-
state transit of dangerous materials. The lithium transportation requirements
would be assumed under present regulatory action.
SEVERITY RATING: 3
UNCERTAINTY RATING: 1
REFERENCES: 8, 66
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TECHNOLOGY:Fusion Power System
ISSUENO. i0
PROCESS:Transportation of waste materials.
PROBLEMSOURCE: General population health: low-level radiation exposure.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: Because of the nonvolatile nature of the activa-
tion products, the general population dose associated with waste disposal
requirements of a fusion facility should be less than those for a similar
fission facility.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: Impact estimates are not appropriate in the
absence of more precise information concerning the disposal requirements of a
fusion facility.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: The requirements for transport of waste
from fusion facilities must be further evaluated.
REGULATORYSTATUS: The radiologal hazard posed by transport of waste from
fusion facilities should be covered by present NRCregulations on waste
disposal.
SEVERITYRATING: B
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 3
REFERENCES:60, 63
iii
TECHNOLOGY:Fusion Power System
ISSUENO. Ii
PROCESS:Operation and maintenance of reactor.
PROBLEMSOURCE: Occupational safety: Worker injury resulting from fire,
explosion, and projectile formation due to component failure.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: The energy content of an operating fusion reactor
is estimated to be on the order of tens of thousands of gigajoules. The
principal portion of this energy is contained in the circulating liquid
lithium. However, other sources are the plasma itself, the vacuum in the
reactor vessel, and the stored energy of the magnetic field. Primary concern
is related to the possible instantaneous release of energy from any of these
sources and the resulting damageto the operating system. It is estimated
that a complete energy release for lithium would be equal to that of 1.5
million liters of fuel oil. Workers would be at risk from the ensuing explo-
sive force, fire, and projectiles ejected from the failing subsystem.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: A detailed quantitative estimate of accident
consequences is not possible without more detailed reactor designs than are
presently available.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: The probability and extent of consequences
of hypothetical accident scenarios within an operating fusion power plant.
REGULATORYSTATUS: None identified other than good engineering practice and
OSHAworkplace hazards regulations.
SEVERITYRATING: A
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 3
REFERENCE:57
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TECHNOLOGY:Fusion Power System
ISSUENO. 12
PROCESS:Plant construction.
PROBLEMSOURCE:Occupational safety: construction site accidents.
HEALTHAND SAFETYIMPACT: Construction of a fusion plant is expected to
require a commitment of effort and materials similar to that of a fission
power plant. Workplace hazards associated with the fusion plant construction
site are also expected to be similar and result in the same level of worker
injury.
QUANTITATIVEIMPACTESTIMATE: Assuming that standard construction industry
accident rates will hold for a fusion plant work site, an anticipated worker
injury rate of 0.002 - 0.004 fatal injury can be allocated to the operation
of a plant over its assumed30-year lifetime.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: Future work force size and accident rates
must be projected into the time frame of a year-2000 technology.
REGULATORYSTATUS: No unique construction site requirements are known that
would require workplace safety standards that are not presently in effect.
SEVERITYRATING: 3
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 1
REFERENCE:8
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TECHNOLOGY:Fusion Power System
ISSUENO. 13
PROCESS:Plant deactivation.
PROBLEM SOURCE: General public health: low-level radiation exposure.
HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACT: The possibility exists for significant levels
of radiation to be released during decommissioning and subsequent dismantling
of a fusion power plant. Exposure of members of the decommissioning team or
general public can be hypothesized if proper precautions similar to those for
fission plants are not observed. The activation inventory of the reactor is
calculated to have levels on the order of thousands of curies and half-llves
on the order of tens to hundreds of years. In light of these assumptions the
most probable course of action would be for the plant to be mothballed or
entombed so as to guarantee limited access to the potential radiation hazard.
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ESTIMATE: No estimates are possible without more precise
definitions of the fusion system and its operating characteristics.
MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES REQUIRING R&D: No information is available on the actual
conditions a decommissioned fusion reactor would exhibit and from which
human impacts could be inferred.
SEVERITY RATING: B
UNCERTAINTY RATING: 3
REFERENCES: 58, 60, 67
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TECHNOLOGY:Fusion Power System
ISSUENO. 14
PROCESS:Catastrophic event potential.
PROBLEMSOURCE: Acute radiation exposure and continuous contamination of
water supplies by toxic agents.
HEALTHANDSAFETYIMPACT: A general catastrophe sequence would involve
explosive rupture of the fusion reactor vessel and release of its entire
radioactive inventory. Other components of the reactor system would also be
liberated into the surrounding air and water. Exposure of the general public
to high levels of tritium could lead to increased incidence of cancer; a
similar result could also occur from release of beryllium compoundsin the
first wall of the reactor.
MAJORUNCERTAINTIESREQUIRINGR&D: More detailed information is required on
the types of failures possible under catastrophic situations and their poten-
tial impact on the general public.
REGULATORYSTATUS: Regulatory aspects of a fusion facility would be expected
to be similar to those for fission plants.
SEVERITYRATING: A
UNCERTAINTYRATING: 3
REFERENCES:57, 59, 60, 65
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